BALANCING AcT: NEwJERsEY WALKS A LINE BETWEEN
THE PROS AND CONS OF ATT"ORNEY SOLICITATION OF
CLIENTS

INTRODUCTION

No aspect of attorney ethics has been more fiercely debated
than client solicitation.' Many lawyers oppose solicitation, deeming it
beneath their professional dignity! These opponents argue that the
practice of law is a "profession,"" not a competitive business. MoreoSee Dorothy Virginia Kibler, Note, Commercial Speech and Disciplinary Rules
Preventing Attorney Advertising and Solicitation: Consumer Loses with the Zauderer Decision,
65 N.C. L. REV. 170, 170 (1986). There is contention between attorneys who believe
that solicitation is inherently wrong and those who tread near the boundaries set in
commercial speech cases. See id. at 186-87; see also infra notes 2-17 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of client solicitation); infra
note 15 (defining commercial speech). This debate will continue because the number of attorneys in the United States is increasing, which, in turn, stimulates solicitation. See Scott R. Bickford & Paula Hamilton Lee, Restricting Lawyers' Solicitation of
Victims, BRIEF, Fall 1995, at 26 (noting that in the United States there will be one million attorneys by the year 2000, or one out of every 267 people).
See Melissa George, Note, Let Sleeping Plaintiffs Lie: RestrictingAttorneys' Rights to
Make Direct-MailSolicitation,22J. LEGAL PROF. 251, 251 (1998).
3 See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN
TIMEs 5 (1953). A
profession "refers to a group... pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the
spirit of public service - no less a public service because it may incidentally be a
means of livelihood. Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service is the
primary purpose." Id. A professional subordinates private gain and self-interest to
the public good or interests of clients. See STEVEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 11 (5th ed. 1998).
4 See MaxJ. Luther III, Legal Ethics: The Problem of Solicitation, 44 A.B.A.

J. 554,
554 (1958). Promoting professionalism among bar members is advanced as a reason
for regulating solicitation. See Kristina N. Bailey, Note, "Rainmaking"and D.C. Rule of
Professional Conduct 7.1: The In-Person Solicitation of Clients, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1335, 1349 (1996). The basic notion of competition, inherent in the concept of
trades and occupations, is absent from the meaning of a "profession." See Luther,
supra, at 554. Historically, legal practice was not competitive except, of course, between opposing lawyers. See id.
Today, an attorney's motivation in soliciting clients is probably rooted in attracting business that would otherwise go elsewhere for legal services. See CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 787 (1986).

Thus, unduly broad solicitation rules

raise anti-trust concerns because they are viewed as anti-competitive. See id.
As competition in the legal marketplace has increased, so has the emphasis on
marketing one's legal services. See Bailey, supra, at 1342-43. Thus, despite the tradi-
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ver, opponents readily expound the evils associated with client solicitation, such as intrusiveness, misrepresentation, overreaching, intimidation, and fabricated evidence.5
Further, solicitation presents the real danger that a needy prospective client will retain the first lawyer that he encounters instead
of searching out an advocate qualified and experienced enough to
handle the case.6 Opponents also claim that certain forms of solicitation may trample upon the privacy rights7 of potential clients. 8 Retional prohibitions, lawyers are engaging in client solicitation. See id. at 1343. No
member of the community is safe from the business generation tactics of the modern attorney. See id. Attorneys are always busy trying to find new clients. See id.
In fact, lawyers are instructed by general marketing strategies to make small talk
with a potential client and then to ask directly for the individual's legal business. See
id. at 1344. These marketing materials also suggest that an attorney identify target
clients and then stage coincidental meetings. See id. Not surprisingly, marketing
materials do not pay significant attention to the ethical issues associated with modern solicitation and contend that the American Bar Association's (ABA) ethical directives apply only to lawyers who solicit clients at mass disaster scenes or on television. See id. at 1343.
5 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
462 (1978); Deborah L.
Rhode, Solicitation, 36J. LEGAL EDuc. 317, 321 (1986). Other evils associated with
solicitation are overcharging, fraud, bribery, undue influence, underrepresentation,
and exploitative or indelicate forms of client contact. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462;
Rhode, supra, at 319-21. See, e.g., In re Pajerowski, 156 N.J. 509, 520, 522, 721 A.2d
922, 998, 999 (1998) (per curiam) (citing fabricating false medical claims as an evil).
See Eric S. Roth, Note, Confronting Solicitation of Mass Disaster Victims, 2 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 967, 979 (1989).
7 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
§ 14.26, at
757 (4th ed. 1991). The phrase "right of privacy" has many meanings. See id. In
pertinent part, the right of privacy "encompasses a freedom from intrusion by others
into privately owned areas as well as freedom from disclosures of information about
an individual's private life." Id. Relevant torts concerning the invasion of property
include unreasonable intrusion and public disclosure of private facts. See W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 854-63 (5th ed.
1984).
The United States Constitution does not expressly grant a right to privacy. See
Judith Beth Prowda, Report: A Lawoyer's Ramble Down the Information Superhighway:
Privacy and Security of Data, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 738, 738 (1995). The United States
Supreme Court has based the general right of privacy on the
First Amendment's freedoms of expression and association, the Fourth
Amendment's protection of persons, places, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizure, the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination and requirement of due process, penumbras
of the Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment, and the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of ordered liberty.
Id. at 738-39 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-91
(Goldberg, J., concurring); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
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gardless of the true impact of solicitation, it is undeniable that these
alleged evils have caused irreparable harm to the public's perception
of the legal profession.9
Proponents insist that certain types of solicitation produce benefits for both the general population and the legal community.'0 Solicitation, they argue, is an effective way to disseminate information
about legal services to the public. 1 With increasingly complex regulations and statutes, a lay person may not be aware of his legal
rights.'2 Moreover, solicitation causes competition among attorneys,
which, in turn, has the ability to improve the substance of legal work

616, 627-30 (1886)).
8 See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 787; Roth, supra note 6, at 979. Solicitation has
the potential to invade privacy, for example, whenever a prospective client opens a
letter or answers the phone. See Elizabeth D. Whitaker & David S. Coale, Professional
Imae and Lawyer Advertising, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 801, 818 (1997).
See Bailey, supra note 4, at 1350. Not surprisingly, approximately 45% of persons receiving written solicitations after an accident or disaster had a negative reaction to the correspondence. See George, supra note 2, at 251.
Furthermore, it is apparent from the wealth of lawyer jokes that the public condemns the solicitation methods used by some attorneys. See, e.g., THE RODENT,
One
EXPLAINING THE INEXPuCABLE: THE RODENT'S GUIDE TO LAwYERS 119 (1995).
author refers to personal injury attorneys as "parachute attorneys:"
The Parachute Attorney specializes in huge disasters such as explosions at chemical plants, airplane and train crashes, floods, earthquakes, fires, and other events creating an abundance of victims/clients. The Parachute Attorney strikes while the iron is hot (i.e.,
the bodies are still warm) by traveling to the site of the disaster, feigning sympathy for the victims and their survivors, and then hitting them
with sales pitches.
Id. See generally Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care , 29
SETON HALL L. REV. 1405 (1999) (positing historical, psychological, social, and cultural bases for the public antipathy toward attorneys and proposing that the legal
profession's efforts are unlikely to counteract that sentiment).
10See Salvatore Villani, Note, The New Yor* Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility Should Be Amended with Respect to Attorney Solicitation of Clients As Proposed By the
House of Delegates of the New York State Bar Association, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 227, 235
(1998); Bailey, supra note 4, at 1351; see also infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text
(describing some of these benefits).
1 See Bailey, supra note 4, at 1351. Interestingly, 70% of the populace does not
seek legal assistance because they mistakenly believe that "fees are unaffordable or
because they have no way to select an attorney other than making a random choice
from the 'yellow pages' of the telephone directory." Kibler, supra note 1, at 188.
12 See Bailey, supra note 4, at 1351. The ban on solicitation originated when the
law was simple enough that citizens were cognizant of the necessity for legal counsel.
See id. Today, however, when a person is injured, he might sign an inadequate release offered by an insurance adjuster. See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 787. Also, a
person under arrest might talk to law enforcement without knowledge of the advantages of legal counsel. See id. The legal market is inefficient when the consumer is
not cognizant of his need for legal services. See Bailey, supra note 4, at 1351.
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and reduce legal fees. 3 Advocates also assert that state-enforced prohibitions of solicitation may violate their protected First Amendment 4 rights to free speech about lawful services, ' group association, 6 and freedom of expression. 7
1s

SeeVillani, supra note 10, at 235. With more lawyers competing for clients, po-

tential clients are able to select their attorney based on quality. See id. In addition,
lawyers must reduce their fees in a competitive solicitation market to compete for
clients. See id.
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
15 See U.S. CONST. amend. I, supra note 14. An attorney
might argue that his solicitation was a form of free speech; however, courts might classify this conduct as
commercial speech, which does not enjoy the same First Amendment protections.
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). Commercial
speech is "'expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience.'" Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993)
(quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980)). For the evolvement of cases dealing with commercial speech, see Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (holding that commercial speech is not
protected speech); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (holding that commercial speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (holding
that commercial speech is protected speech, but some types of commercial speech
regulation are permissible); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (1980) (expounding a
four-part test used to determine whether commercial speech is protected); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504-08 (1996) (invalidating a blanket ban
on truthful, nonmisleading advertising).
16 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 460 (1958). The United
States Supreme Court recognized a general right of association in NAACP v. Alabama. See id. The Court explained that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association .... " Id. The Supreme Court grounded its decision in the term "liberty"
found within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which embraces
free speech. See id. The Justices found that it is immaterial whether the ideas sought
to be furthered by the association concern economic, cultural, religious, or political
matters. See id.
Since NAACP v. Alabama, the Court has considered three distinct aspects of the
right to associate. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 7, § 16.41, at 1063. First, persons may associate to attain goals that are not connected to a fundamental right. See
id. Next, the "freedom to associate is protected by the concept of liberty in the due
process clauses and as an implicit part of the Bill of Rights guarantees; this right is
connected to the fundamental right to privacy." Id. Finally, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged a right to associate in order to engage in activities that are expressly
guaranteed by the First Amendment. See id. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 421
(1978) (asserting that a lawyer's activity is constitutionally protected as association).
1 See, e.g., Primus, 436 U.S. at 421 (contending that
a lawyer's activity is expression that is constitutionally protected). Although the First Amendment guarantees
the freedom of expression, certain categories of expression are not afforded First
Amendment protection because they "are considered to be of less social value be-

1999]

A 7TORNEY SOLICITA TION OF CLIENTS

1547

The NewJersey Supreme Court, in promulgating prohibitions of
solicitation, has wrestled with the difficult task of balancing these
competing interests regarding solicitation." Prohibitions must allow
those attorneys who depend on client solicitation to find work in today's competitive legal market.'9 They must provide adequate guidance to attorneys as to what forms of solicitation are prohibited.2
Further, these prohibitions cannot interfere with a lawyer's First
Amendment rights to group association, freedom of expression, and
freedom to speak truthfully about legal rights and services.' Still, the
court cannot allow attorney solicitation to violate the lay person's privacy rights.2
This Note considers whether the New Jersey Supreme Court has
successfully balanced these competing interests. Part I of this Note
reviews the history of attorney solicitation of clients and the prohibitions thereof. It traces the United States Supreme Court case law that
has shaped New Jersey law with regard to attorney solicitation of clients. Next, Part II addresses the New Jersey rule pertaining to prohibitions of client solicitation. Part III surveys three recent New Jersey
Supreme Court decisions that have interpreted this rule. Finally, Part
IV examines how effectively the supreme court has balanced the
competing interests associated with attorney solicitation of clients.
cause they infringe upon other rights." Andrew Spett, Comment, A Pig inthe Parlor:
An Examination of Legislation Directed at Obscenity and Indecency on the Internet, 26
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 599, 602-03 (1996) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957)). Further, in United States v. O'Brien, the Supreme Court held that
"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations of First Amendment freedoms." 391 U.S.
367, 376 (1968). The O'Brien Court articulated a four-part test used to determine
whether a governmental regulation may incidentally infringe upon the freedom of
expression. See id. at 377. The elements of the test include whether the governmental regulation is within the government's constitutional power, advances an important or substantial governmental interest, "is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression," and the restriction is not greater than is necessary to further that interest. Id.
18 See infra Part IV (addressing the attempt of the
New Jersey Supreme Court to
balance these interests).
19 See supra note 4 and accompanying text
(discussing the legal market's competitive nature).
20 See In re Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna, Reitman
& Greenstein, 155 N.J. 357,
377, 379-80, 715 A.2d 216, 226-27 (1998) (per curiam) (O'Hern, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating that discipline should not be imposed because
the attorneys did not have proper notice of the type of conduct prohibited by an
ethical directive) [hereinafter In reTEAMI.AW].
2
See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment
concerns implicated by restricting attorney solicitation of clients).
See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing privacy concerns implicated by permitting attorney solicitation of clients).
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I
A.

History of Prohibitionsof Client Solicitation

Since ancient times,' attorneys have engaged in various methods
of solicitation."
Traditionally, lawyers, by their own efforts or
through the use of runners, have actively sought clients in person."
Attorneys have also instituted targeted mail campaigns and personal
telephone calls to generate business." More recently, lawyers have
turned to e-mail to solicit clients.26
See Louise L. Hill, Solicitation By Lawyers: Piercing the First Amendment Veil, 42
ME. L. REv. 369, 370 (1990). In Greece, by the sixth century, B.C., a litigant, who
did not have friends or family to escort or assist him at trial, was allowed to be
helped by outsiders. See id. at 370-71. This was known as the privilege of intervention. See id. at 371. In time, this privilege was abused and the intervenor became
known as a "'sycophant,' an individual who voluntarily undertook the prosecution of
a matter, being motivated by money, prestige, or political advantage." Id. Under
the Roman system, the intervenor was known as a calumniator. See id. at 372-73.
24 See id. at 370.
Solicitation is defined as "[a]sking; enticing; urgent request .... Any action which the relation of the parties justifies in construing into a
serious request." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (6th ed. 1990). It occurs when a
lawyer makes a "personal appeal directed toward a prospective client." Hill, supra
note 23, at 388. The term solicitation is broadly defined and has been interpreted
by the courts to encompass myriad practices. See Luther, supra note 4, at 554; see also
infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (citing in-person, telephone, mail, and email as possible forms of solicitation). In fact, "[t]he methods of solicitation are as
various as are the possible routes to the source of persons with legal troubles."
WOLFRAM, supranote 4, at 786.
Contrary to what some may believe, plaintiffs' attorneys are not the only ones to
engage in solicitation. See George, supra note 2, at 259. Defense attorneys also actively solicit clients. See id.
See BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY 1333 (6th ed. 1990). A runner is a "[p]erson who
solicits business for [an] attorney from accident victims." Id.
See WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at 785-86. One notable example of in-person solicitation occurred after a deadly fire in the Dupont Plaza Hotel, located in San
Juan, Puerto Rico. See Roth, supra note 6, at 973. Lawyers from the United States
went to the disaster site and hospitals in Puerto Rico and directly approached the
victims and their families in order to gain legal employment. See id.
See George, supranote 2, at 259-61; Christopher R. Lavoie, Note, Have You Been
Injured in an Accident? The Problem of Lauwer Advertising and Solicitation, 30 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 413, 428 (1997). One memorable example of mail solicitation occurred after the 1988 Shell Oil explosion in Louisiana. See Bickford & Lee, supra note 1, at
28. Defense counsel for Shell Oil mailed a settlement offer to nearby residents. See
id.; see also infra note 96 (noting a form of mail solicitation used by the airline industry in response to aircraft disasters).
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed telephone solicitation, but
bans on this form of solicitation have been enacted. See Whitaker & Coale, supra
note 8, at 818. Telephone solicitation has been equated with in-person solicitation
rather than targeted mailings. See Lavoie, supra, at 428.
28 SeeJ.T. Westermeier & Leonard T. Nuara, Ethical Issues for Lawyers on
the Internet and the World We Web, 525 PLI/Pat 163, 179-81 (1998). The use of mass e-mail
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The history of prohibitions of solicitation closely tracks the development of the legal profession itself.29 American prohibitions of
client solicitation can be traced to medieval England." These prohibitions were aimed at discouraging certain practices, such as barratry,31 champerty, 2 and maintenance." The United States legal community subsequently adopted British prohibitions of solicitation.
American lawyers observed these prohibitions until the early
nineteenth century, when they came to be regarded as undemocratic.55 Thereafter, it became commonplace for prominent lawyers
to engage in the solicitation of clients.36 In 1908, however, the
to prospective clients raises grave solicitation concerns. See id. at 180. This is because technology permits personal and quick communications with potential clients
at virtually no cost to the attorney. See id. The concerns over e-mail stemmed from
the "green card" incident. See id. In 1993, two immigration attorneys posted an advertisement to many internet news groups, which was mailed to 30,000 e-mail addresses and appeared in about 140 countries. See id.
See Michael Hegarty, Note, Constitutional Law - First Amendment Commercial
Speech -Attorney Solicitation -In reVon Wiegen, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 191, 192 (1985).
In fact, proscriptions against solicitation are rooted in Greek law. See Hill, supra
note 23, at 370. Prohibitions on solicitations began in ancient Greece. See Hegarty,
supra, at 192. The Greeks instituted prohibitions in order to prevent maintenance,
to uphold the integrity of the justice system, to prevent vexatious and oppressive litigation, and to protect harassed litigants. See id.
See Rhode, supra note 5, at 317. During this period of time, the tribunals of
England were corrupted, and the legal profession disliked maintaining a financial
interest in the outcome of lawsuits and arousing frivolous litigation. See id. at 317-18.
The English barristers, who were wealthy aristocrats, did not practice for monetary gain. See Bailey, supra note 4, at 1335; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 151 (6th
ed. 1990) (defining a barrister as "a counsellor learned in the law who has been admitted to plead at the bar, and who is engaged in conducting the trial or argument
of causes"). Therefore, there was no reason for the barristers to compete with each
other for clients. See Luther, supra note 4, at 554.
s1 See Rhode, supra note 5, at 317. Barratry is the offense of frequently stirring
up and exciting quarrels or lawsuits. SeeBLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 150 (6th ed. 1990).
s2 See Rhode, supra note 5, at 317. Champerty is a bargain between a party to a
lawsuit and a stranger, whereby the stranger pursues the suit in return for a share of
any judgment proceeds. See BLACK'S LAw DIcIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990). This is a
form of maintenance. See id.; see also infra note 33 and accompanying text (defining
maintenance).
s3 See Rhode, supra note 5, at 317. Maintenance is the assistance of others to
prosecute or defend a lawsuit without just cause. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROSSIONALRESPONSIBiLIT: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE MEMOD 111 (1994).
34 See Hegarty, supranote
29, at 193.
s5 See Edward Simpson Stoffregen, III, Comment, Client Solicitation and the First
Amendment: In re Rapport Characterizedas AssociationalFreedom, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 351,
352 (1994). Several states repealed the prohibitions in order to open up the legal
practice to all persons. See id.
See Bailey, supra note 4, at 1335. Abraham Lincoln, as a practicing attorney,
engaged in solicitation. See WOLFRAm, supra note 4, at 785-86. Furthermore, in the
Dred Scott, the Peter Zenger, and the Aaron Burr cases, prominent attorneys, without the client's prior invitation, approached persons in legal difficulty and offered
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American Bar Association (ABA) 7 enacted a Canon of Ethics? that,
in part, reinstituted the prohibitions of solicitation."
It is unclear why American sentiment shifted toward prohibiting
solicitation once again.40 One explanation is that "Victorian snobbery"41 motivated attorneys to distinguish their profession from other
trades by relying purely on their reputations to generate business.4
An alternative explanation is that white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants
sought to end competition from recent immigrants, whom they
viewed as unworthy of practicing law.4
their services. See id. at 786.
57 See RHODE, supra note 33, at 46. The ABA
was formed in Saratoga, N.Y. in
1878. See id. It commenced as an elite society with selective membership criteria
and a myriad of legal and social reform policies. See id.
S8 See id. The ABA adopted 32 canons with little debate or controversy.
See id.
Most states adopted the canons through legislative or judicial enactment. See id.
Other states treated the canons as authoritative guidelines in bar disciplinary and
judicial actions. See id. The drafters of the canons were concerned about the commercialization of the profession and with the regulation of "ambulance chasers." See
id.
The canons were modeled after an earlier Alabama Code that borrowed heavily
from the works of George Sharswood, a judge from Pennsylvania, and David Hoffman, a law professor from Maryland. See id. at 45, 46. Sharswood's and Hoffman's
treatises focused on ethics and etiquette, and their standards discouraged any selfpromoting or dishonorable conduct that might reflect negatively on an attorney's
public standing. See id. at 45.
See Bailey, supra note 4, at 1335-36. The canon that prohibited solicitation
stated that "[iut is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1967).
The canon imposed a duty on each "member of the Bar having knowledge of such
practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof, to the
end that the offender may be disbarred." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 28
(1967).
40 See Bailey, supra note 4, at 1335 n.8 and accompanying
text.
4
See WOLFRAM, supa note 4, at 776. "Victorian snobbery" consisted of denigrating any profession that tainted itself by taking on the characteristics of a trade. See
id.; supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (defining a profession).
42 See Bailey, supra note
4, at 1335.
43 See Stoffregen, supra note 35, at 353. The contempt of competition
in the legal profession may have stemmed from class, religious, and ethnic biases. SeeJEROLD
S. AUERBACH, UNEQUALJUSTIcE:

LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 50

(1976). The "[p]rohibitions on client solicitation helped to safeguard the profession's image by discouraging unseemly entrepreneurship among its lower echelons,
particularly religious and ethnic minorities." Rhode, supra note 5, at 318.
The canon proscribing solicitation discriminated against personal injury attorneys, who were known as "ambulance chasers." See AUERBAcH, supra, at 43. It also
impeded lawyers who worked in highly competitive urban markets with transient clients. See id. Catholic and Jewish immigrant attorneys of "lower-class" origin were
concentrated among these urban solo practitioners. See id. at 50. Ambulance chasers were also ridiculed because of their accents, "and their perseverance was denigrated as aggressiveness...." Id.
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Regardless of the reason, the ABA has continued to support
prohibitions of solicitation." In 1970, the ABA adopted the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which continued to prohibit solicitation.4 Thirteen years later, the ABA revised these prohibitions
in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules).46 These
Model Rules were formulated primarily to provide guidance to attorneys, and violations of such directives do not give rise to civil liability.47 Today, the prohibitions of solicitation can be found in Model
Rule 7.3."
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RuLES]
Rule

7.3 (1998). See infra note 48 and accompanying text (expounding Model Rule 7.3).
The initial version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) was
enacted in 1983. See GILLERs, supranote 3, at 5.
See GILLERS, supra note 3, at 4-5. Practitioners were dissatisfied with the
Canon's vague standards, so the ABA formed a committee to draft the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility (Model Code). See Bailey, supra note 4, at 1337. All
states, in some form, quickly adopted the Model Code. See GILLERS, supra note 3, at
4. The prohibitions of solicitation are addressed in two parts of the Model Code. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter MODEL CODE] DR 2-103
(1969); MODEL CODE DR 2-104 (1969). The Model Code stated that "[a] lawyer shall
not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or
associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a
lawyer." MODEL CODE DR 2-103(A) (1969). Furthermore, the Model Code provided
in relevant part that "[a] lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he
should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting
from that advice. ... " MODEL CODE DR 2-104(A) (1969).
46 See GILLERS, supra note 3, at 5. In 1977, the ABA appointed a commission,

which became known as the Kutak Commission, to prepare these new rules. See id.
At the beginning of 1998, more than 40 states had adopted some version of the
Model Rules. See id. at 5. NewJersey became the first state to adopt the Model Rules
in 1984. See id.
47 See MODEL RULEs Preamble, at 6 (1999).
48 See MODEL RULES Rule 7.3 (1999). Model Rule 7.3
provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit
professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a significant
motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective client by written or recorded communication or by in-person
or telephone contact even when not otherwise prohibited by paragraph (a), if:
(1) the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer; or
(2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or harassment.
(c) Every written or recorded communication from a lawyer soliciting professional employment from a prospective client known to be in
need of legal services in a particular matter, and with whom the lawyer
has no family or prior professional relationship, shall include the
words "Advertising Material" on the outside envelope and at the beginning and ending of any recorded communication.
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United States Supreme Court Case Law

The United States Supreme Court invalidates, by its appellate jurisdiction, any ABA provisions as adopted by individual states that violate the United States Constitution, namely the First Amendment."
Federal constitutional interpretations made by the United States Supreme Court are binding on the New Jersey Supreme Court.,°
In NAACP v. Button, ' the Supreme Court considered First
Amendment protection for client solicitation for the first time.52 The
Button Court distinguished between solicitation for pecuniary gain
and solicitation as a type of political expression." The Button Court
afforded First Amendment protection to solicitation deemed to be
political expression because such solicitation serves the public interest. 4 In In re Primus,o the United States Supreme Court applied ButSee Bailey, supra note 4, at 1338. The United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to determine the
protections that the Constitution provides. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177, 180 (1803).
50 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 344 (1816). State law is
subordinate to federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. See id.; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
51

371 U.S. 415 (1963).

See Stoffregen, supra note 35, at 353. United States Supreme Court attorney
advertising cases must be considered in conjunction with solicitation cases. See Hill,
supra note 23, at 388. Lawyer advertising is a communication that tells the public
that an attorney is available to perform legal services. See id.
For the progression of cases dealing with attorney advertising, see Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (holding that a state cannot subject attorney
advertising to blanket suppression, but can constitutionally place restrictions on attorney advertising if it is misleading, deceptive, or false); In re R.MJ, 455 U.S. 191,
203 (1982) (holding that, even if an advertisement is not misleading, a state may
regulate advertisements if there is a substantial interest and the regulation is narrowly tailored to that interest); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinay Counse4 471 U.S. 626,
638 (1985) (holding that lawyer advertising is afforded constitutional protection and
that commercial speech that is not deceptive, false, or concerning unlawful activities
may be restricted if a substantial governmental interest is present and only through
modes that directly promote that interest); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary
Commission, 496 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1990) (holding that a lawyer has a constitutional
right to advertise himself as a specialist if the advertisement is not misleading).
See Button, 371 U.S. at 443.
See id. at 431. In Button, the NAACP sought a declaration that its method of
soliciting clients was protected speech and, accordingly, that a Virginia statute that
prohibited solicitation was unconstitutional. See id. at 428. The NAACP solicited cli52
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ton and determined that a state could not prohibit in-person solicitation by an organization that relied on litigation as a means of political association and expression.5 6
Solicitation for pecuniary gain has not enjoyed the same First
Amendment protections as political expression." In Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n,5 the Justices upheld a blanket ban on in-person solicitation by lawyers for pecuniary gain." The Ohralik Court explained
that, in order for the ban to survive First Amendment scrutiny, the
state must possess an important interest in avoiding harm to its citizens60 In Ohralik, the state's important interests included regulating
commercial transactions and protecting consumers, maintaining
standards
of licensed professionals, and preventing vexatious con6
duct.

'

ents in public school desegregation matters by calling a meeting at which parents
signed pre-printed forms that allowed the NAACP to represent them. See id. at 421.
The Supreme Court determined that these activities were protected as expression
and association under the First Amendment. See id. at 428-29.
436 U.S. 412 (1978).
56 See id. at 426-27. In In re Primus, a cooperating lawyer with
the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) sent a letter to a woman who had been sterilized as a condition of receiving public assistance. See id. at 414-16. The attorney informed this
woman that the ACLU would provide free legal assistance to her. See id. at 416. The
South Carolina Supreme Court found that the attorney violated two disciplinary
rules and ordered a private reprimand. See id. at 418-19.
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the matter and held that solicitation by a non-profit organization implicates interests of political expression and association sufficient to justify First Amendment protection. See id. at 426-28. Furthermore, the Court distinguished Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978), on the grounds that Ohralik involved in-person solicitation for monetary
gain. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 434; see also infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text
(discussing Ohralik).
57 See Primus, 436 U.S.
at 434.
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
See id. at 453 n.9, 468. In Ohralik,an attorney solicited employment from two
women who were injured in a car accident. See id. at 449-52. The Supreme Court of
Ohio found that the attorney violated two disciplinary rules and that his conduct was
not constitutionally protected. See id. at 453-54.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the state's blanket ban on in-person
solicitation because the state demonstrated strong interests supporting the prohibition. See id. at 460, 467-68. The court reasoned that, short of a blanket prohibition,
in-person solicitation of clients would be immune from regulation and oversight by
the profession or state because it is essentially invisible. See id. at 466-67; cf Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 764 (1993) (holding that, although Ohralik is good law
concerning lawyers, certified public accountants could not be categorically banned
from in-person solicitation).
no See Ohralik 436 U.S. at 459.
61 See id. at 460-62. The court noted that states have a "'compelling'
interest in
preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious conduct.'" Id. at 462.
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Further, the Supreme Court has distinguished between inperson solicitation and targeted mailings." In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n,0 the Court ruled that, under the First Amendment, a state may
not categorically prohibit attorneys from soliciting clients by truthful,
non-deceptive, targeted mail solicitation." In the recent case F/orida
Bar v. Went for It, Inc.," however, the United States Supreme Court
upheld a rule enacted by the Florida Bar Association that barred lawyers from distributing targeted direct-mail solicitations to prospective
clients within thirty days of a disaster or accident.6 The Went for It
case opened the door for states to craft restrictions on targeted mail-

See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 475 (1988). In Shapero,
the
Justices observed that targeted mail solicitation did not carry with it the harms associated with in-person solicitation of clients, namely overreaching and undue influence. See id. at 475 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,
6

642 (1985)).
486 U.S. 466 (1988).

See id. at 479. In 1985, a Kentucky lawyer applied to the Kentucky Attorneys
Advertising Commission for approval of a writing that he wanted to send to prospective clients threatened by foreclosure proceedings. See id. at 469. The letter stated:
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If
this is true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep your home by ORDERING your creditor [sic] to STOP
and give you more time to pay them.
You may call my office anytime from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for FREE
information on how you can keep your home.
Call NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for
you. Just call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is
FREE, there is NO charge for calling.
Id. (alteration in original). The Supreme Court held that, even though the state did
not have a substantial interest in prohibiting this type of solicitation, there were less
restrictive means by which a state could regulate the mailings. See id. at 477-79.

515 U.S. 618 (1995).

See id. at 620-21. The Florida rule was enacted in response to a two-year study
on the public's opinion of lawyers that indicated contempt for the legal profession.
See id. at 620, 626-27. A Florida attorney and his wholly owned attorney referral service, who routinely sent out such solicitations, contested this rule. See id. at 621.
The Went for It Court applied the Central Hudson test in order to determine
whether the Florida Bar Association could place a ban on attorney speech. See id. at
624-33 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980)). In applying the test to the facts of the case, the Court found that
the bar had a substantial interest in protecting the reputation of the legal profession
and in protecting the privacy of potential clients. See id. at 625. Next, the Court
found that the bar's interest in preventing such conduct advanced the government's
interest in a material and direct manner. See id. at 625-27. Finally, the Court found
that the Florida bar's rule was "reasonably well-tailored to its stated objective of
eliminating targeted mailings whose type and timing [were] a source of distress to
Floridians, distress that.., caused many of them to lose respect for the legal profession." Id. at 633. Thus, the Justices upheld the moratorium because the prongs in
the CentralHudson test were met. See id. at 635.
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ings, regardless of whether the solicitations are deceptive or misleading. 7
II

A.

New Jersey Rules of ProfessionalConduct

Attorneys who practice law in New Jersey must abide by the
Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs) adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court." These rules track the Model Rules promulgated by
the ABA, yet in many respects go further than the ABA Model Rules
in regulating attorney behavior.6 Individual attorneys and law firms
may be held accountable and disciplined for the transgression of
these ethical directives. 70
RPC 7.3 regulates solicitation by imposing certain limitations on
unacceptable conduct.7 Specifically, the rule provides that an attorSee George, supra note 2, at 256-57.
See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-1(a) (1998). Lawyers from other states must abide by the
Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs) when they practice law in NewJersey. See id.
The RPCs were adopted on July 12, 1984, and became effective on September
10, 1984. See Rules of Professional Conduct, N.J. L.J., July 19, 1984, at supp. 1. These
rules replaced the Disciplinary Rules (DR), which had replaced the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1971. See New Rules and Amendments, N.J. L.J., July 15, 1971, at 1.
RPC 7.1 through RPC 7.5 replaced DR 2-101 through DR 2-105 with minor changes.
See N.J. CT. R. 1:14 cmt. (1998); Rule Amendments, N.J. L.J.,Jan. 26, 1984, at 15.
69 See N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT [hereinafter N.J. RULES] Introduction
(1998); Michael P. Ambrosio, The "New" New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct: Reordered Prioritiesfor Public Accountability, 11 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 121, 149 (1987)
(noting that RPC 7.3 is much more far-reaching than the corresponding Model
Rule); see also supranote 48 (reproducing the text of Model Rule 7.3); infra note 71
(reproducing the text of RPC 7.3). The New Jersey Supreme Court revised and
adopted the Model Rules, as advised by the Debevoise Committee, the supreme
court committee on the RPCs. See N.J. RULES Introduction; see also NEW JERSEY
67

68

SUPREME COURT COMMITrEE ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, REPORT

(1983).
70 See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-1(a) (1998); see also In rejacoby & Meyers,
147 N.J. 374, 374
(1997) (holding for the first time in the United States that a law firm can be disciplined for a transgression of ethical directives); see also Rocco Cammarere, 1997-98
Supreme Court Term: Lawyering Issues Dominate, N.J. LAW., Aug. 17, 1998, at 1.
In NewJersey, "[t]he primary purpose of discipline is to protect the public, and
not to punish the attorney." In re Pajerowski, 156 N.J. 509, 521, 721 A.2d 992, 999
(1998) (per curiam) (citing In re Rutledge, 101 N.J. 493, 498, 502 A.2d 569, 572
(1986)).
71 See N.J. RULES Rule 7.3 (1998). The rule
provides:
(a) A lawyer may initiate personal contact with a prospective client
for the purpose of obtaining professional employment, subject to the
requirements of paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer shall not contact, or send a written communication
to, a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional em-
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ney may not solicit a client if he knows or reasonably should know
that the client is unable to exercise reasonable judgment in employstate.
ing a lawyer due to an impaired physical, emotional, or mental
In interpreting RPC 7.3, the New Jersey Supreme Court has applied
an objective standard and, in the alternative, a knowledge standard
that imposes a duty of inquiry upon the attorney."
B. Enforcement of New Jersey Rule of ProfessionalConduct 7.3
In 1983, the NewJersey Supreme Court established the Office of
Attorney Ethics (OAE), which has jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute all ethics matters, including violations of RPC 7.3.74 Four
years later, the court found it necessary to form a committee that
dealt exclusively with solicitation and attorney advertising and, thus,
ployment if:
(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical,
emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could
not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer, or
(2) the person has made known to the lawyer a desire not to receive communications from the lawyer, or
(3) the communication involves coercion, duress or harassment;
or
(4) the communication involves unsolicited direct contact with a
prospective client within thirty days after a specific mass-disaster event,
when such contact concerns potential compensation arising from the
event; or
(5) the communication involves unsolicited direct contact with a
prospective client concerning a specific event not covered by section
(4) of this Rule when such contact has pecuniary gain as a significant
motive except that a lawyer may send a letter by mail to a prospective
client in such circumstances provided the letter.
(i) bears the word "ADVERTISEMENT" prominently displayed in
capital letters at the top of the first page of text; and
(ii) contains the following notice at the bottom of the last page of
text: "Before making your choice of attorney, you should give this
matter careful thought. The selection of an attorney is an important
decision."; and
(iii) contains an additional notice also at the bottom of the last
page of text that the recipient may, if the letter is inaccurate or misleading, report same to the Committee on Attorney Advertising,
HughesJustice Complex, CN 037, Trenton, NewJersey 08625.
Id.
7Seid.
7 See In re Anis, 126 N.J. 448, 457, 599 A.2d 1265, 1270 (1992) (per curiam)
(recognizing that an objective standard attaches to RPC 7.3(b)(1)); In re
TEAMLAW, 155 N.J 357, 376, 715 A.2d 216, 225 (1998) (per curiam) (stating that,
because attorney had actual knowledge, the objective standard need not be applied).
7
See NJ. Cr. R. 1:20-1(a) (1998); N.J. CT. R. 1:20-2(b)(3) (1998); N.J. Cr. R.
1:20-2(b) (4) (1998); Supreme Court Announces New Office of Attorney Ethics, N.J. LJ.,
July 28, 1983, at 1.
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created the Committee on Attorney Advertising (CAA) .' Today, the
CAA has exclusive jurisdiction to review any solicitation matter that
the OAE chooses to prosecute. 6 The actions of the CAA may be appealed to the state's Disciplinary Review Board (DRB)." If the DRB
recommends disbarment, its determination must be reviewed by the
New Jersey Supreme Court.78 The supreme court has the option to
grant review to all other disciplinary decisions.7
III
The contours of RPC 7.3 and its enforcement have been worked
out in case law. This Part explores three recent cases that have applied RPC 7.3 to sanction attorneys for overly aggressive solicitation
of clients at times when the potential clients were physically, emotionally, or mentally vulnerable due to tragic accidents. An examination of the recent decisions reveals that the court has neglected to

See In re Felmeister & Isaacs, 104 N.J. 515, 548-51, 518 A.2d 188, 205-07
(1986)
(deciding to create a permanent Committee on Attorney Advertising (CAA)); see also
N.J. CT. R. 1:19A (1998); Committee on Attorney Advertising Appointed, N.J. L.J.,Jan. 22,
1987, at 3.
76 See N.J. CT. R. 1:19A-2(a) (1998). Prior to the creation
of the CAA, the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics had jurisdiction over and issued opinions regarding advertising questions. See Israel D. Dubin, Index to the Opinions of the Advisory
Committee on ProfessionalEthics, Committee on Attorney Advertising and Committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILUTY IN NEW JERSEY Index/1
(NewJersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education, 1998). The CAA has exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning RPCs 7.1-7.5, with the exception of RPC
7.3(c)-(f). See N.J. Gr. R. 1:19A-2(a) (1998). The CAA does not issue opinions sua
sponte; rather, a written inquiry must be submitted pursuant to N.J. CT. R. 1:19A3(a). SeeN.J. CT. R. 1:19A-3(a) (1998).
77 See N.J. CT. RK1:20-1(a) (1998); N.J. CT. 1K 1:20-15(e)
(1998). The Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) is made up of nine members including lawyers and members of the general public. See N.J. Cr. R. 1:20-15(a) (1998). The DRB has the
power to uphold, reverse, or remand the decision of the CAA. See N.J. CT. R. 1:2015(e) (3) (1998).
See NJ. Cr. R. 1:20-16(a) (1998). Disbarment is permanent. See N.J.
CT. R
1:20-16(i) (1998).
See N.J. Cr. R. 1:20-16(b) (1998). Other forms of discipline include suspension from practice for a certain time period, monetary sanctions, and admonition.
See N.J. Gr. R. 1:20-11 (1998) (temporary suspension); NJ. r. R. 1:20-15(0(4)
(1998) (public admonitions); NJ. Cr. R. 1:20-15 (i) (1998) (temporary suspension);
N.J. CT. R 1:20-15(j) (1998) (sanctions). The type of discipline imposed on an attorney will depend on the circumstances and severity of the offense. See In re Riva,
157 N.J. 34, 41-42, 722 A.2d 933, 937 (1999) (per curiam) (citing In re Nigohosian,
88 NJ. 308, 315, 442 A.2d 1007, 1011 (1982) (per curiam)).
The OAE or individual attorney may file a timely petition for review of a disciplinary action by the supreme court. See NJ. Cr. R 1:20-16(b) (1998). The supreme court may also review a disciplinary action by the DRB sua sponte. See id.
11
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define the actual knowledge standard of the rule and has inconsistently applied this standard.No
A.

In reAnis

On December 21, 1988, Pan American Flight 103 exploded over
Lockerbie, Scotland and killed all passengers on board.8' The day after one victim's* remains were identified, an attorney, Magdy F. Anis,
sent a solicitation letter to the victim's father, Peter Lowenstein."
See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns stemming from the court's failure to define the actual knowledge standard and its inconsistent application of this standard).
8j See In re Anis, 126 N.J. 448, 452, 599 A.2d 1265, 1267 (1992) (per curiam);
Lawrence A. Dubin, NAT'L L.J., May 11, 1992, at 15. On the holiday flight home,
American passengers became the casualties of international terrorism. See Anis, 126
N.J. at 452, 599 A.2d at 1267. An explosive device placed on the plane in Germany
was the likely cause of the disaster. See Dubin, supra, at 15.
See Anis, 126 N.J. at 452, 599 A.2d at 1267. The remains identified were those
of Alexander Lowenstein of Morristown, New Jersey. See id. He was a student at
Syracuse University. See id. Many of the other victims were also college students. See
id.
See id. Alexander Lowenstein's remains were identified on January 3, 1989.
See id. The letter sent to his father on January 4, 1989 stated:
Dear Mr. Lowenstein:
Initially, we would like to extend our deepest sympathy for the loss of
your son, Mr. Alexander Lowenstein. We know that this must be a very
traumatic experience for you, and we hope that you, along with your
relatives and friends, can overcome this catastrophe which has not only
affected your family but has disturbed the world.
As you may realize, you have a legal cause of action against Pan American, among others, for wrongful death due to possible negligent security maintenance. If you intend to take any legal recourse, we urge you
to consider to retain [sic] our firm to prosecute your case.
Both my partner [Fady] and myself are experienced practitioners in
the personal injury field, and feel that we can obtain a favorable outcome for you against the airline, among other possible defendants.
We would also like to inform you that if you do decide to retain our
services, you will not be charged for any attorneys fees unless we collect
a settlement or verdict award for you.
Before retaining any other attorney, it would be worth your while to
contact us, since we will substantially reduce the customary one-third
fee that most other attorneys routinely charge.
Please call us to schedule an appointment at your earliest convenience.
If you are unable to come to our office, please so advise us and we will
have an attorney meet you at a location suitable to your needs.
Very truly yours,
(Mr.) Magdy F. Anis
MFA/seb
P.S. There is no consultation fee.
Id. at 452-53, 599 A.2d at 1267. The New Jersey Supreme Court opined that this letter could have only exacerbated the family's suffering. See id. at 453, 599 A.2d at
1267.
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Lowenstein filed a complaint with the OAE on January 12, 1989,
and alleged that Anis's solicitation violated RPC 7.3(b)(1)." The
CAA reviewed the matter, found that Anis violated RPC 7.3(b) (1),
and recommended a public reprimand. 5 The DRB, however, found
that RPC 7.3(b) (1) had not been violated. 86
On review, the New Jersey Supreme Court framed the issue as
whether the First Amendment commercial speech protections permit
attorneys to engage in conduct that offends common decency. The
Anis court acknowledged that the spectacle of attorneys who prey on
disaster victims, as Anis did, clearly offends societal norms.88
See id., 599 A.2d at 1267-68 The complaint alleged that Anis solicited a potential client when he "knew or should have known that the [prospective client's]
physical, emotional, or mental state was such that the prospective client could not
exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer." Id.
An amended complaint charged that Anis engaged in misleading and false advertising in violation of RPC 7.1(a)(1). See id., 599 A.2d at 1268. The CAA found
that Anis's conduct violated RPC 7.3(a)(1) because he misrepresented his professional background to obtain employment. See id. at 453, 454, 599 A.2d at 1268. The
DRB agreed, and the matter was reviewed by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See id.
at 454-55, 599 A.2d at 1268-69. The court ruled that Anis should be publicly disciplined for violating RPC 7.1(a)(1). See id. at 461, 599 A.2d at 1272. The court reasoned that his letter falsely implied that he had experience in aircraft accident litigation and that he misrepresented attorney fees. See id. The court explained that
Anis's letter stated that a typical lawyer's fee would be one-third, whereas N.J. Cr. R.
1:21-7 provides for graduated fees. See id.
Anis's brother, Fady F. Anis, was also charged in the complaints. See id. at 453,
599 A.2d at 1267-68. The CAA found that Fady Anis violated both RPC 7.3(b) (1)
and RPC 7.1(a)(1). See id. at 453, 454, 599 A.2d at 1268. The DRB disagreed and
determined that no discipline was necessary. See id. at 454, 599 A.2d at 1268. The
DRB recognized that Fady Anis was out of town when the letter was sent to Peter
Lowenstein. See id. Accordingly, because the supreme court must only review a recommendation of disbarment, the charges brought against Fady Anis were not reviewed by the court. See N.J. Cr.R. 1:20-16 (a)(1998).
85 See Anis, 126 N.J. at 454, 599 A.2d at 1268.
See id. at 455, 599 A.2d at 1268. The DRB reasoned that, because the letter
was
sent two weeks after the crash, it was questionable whether Anis would have known
that the Lowenstein family "would be unable to exercise reasonable judgment with
respect to retaining counsel." Id,
The DRB also dismissed a charge that the Anis brothers violated RPC 5.1 (a).
See id. at 454-55, 599 A.2d at 1268 (defining RPC 5.1(a) as "failure to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all members of a law firm conform to the [RPCs]").
87 See id. at 452, 599 A.2d at
1267.
88 See id. at 451, 599 A.2d at 1266. The court retold several horrific examples of
solicitation that have contributed to calls for reform. See id. at 451-52, 599 A.2d
1266-67. Thejustices noted the poison gas leak that occurred at the Union Carbide
chemical plant in Bhopal, India. See id. at 451, 599 A.2d at 1266 (citing Roth, supra
note 6, at 972). The court recalled that American attorneys rushed to India in order
to retain clients. See id.(citing Roth, supra note 6, at 972).
The court next recounted that, after a Northwest airplane crashed in Detroit, a
man impersonating a priest attempted to comfort the victim's families. See id. He
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The court recognized that in Shapero the United States Supreme
Court held that a blanket ban on targeted direct-mail solicitation violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments." The Anis court, however, found that Shapero left open a window of conduct that can be
categorically banned.0 The court indicated that the boundaries of
that window are shaped by the common decency that should attend
the ordinary affairs of mankind.9' The court then reasoned that
Anis's conduct fell within this window. 2 The court stressed, however,
that attorneys still retain the right to distribute non-deceptive, truthful advertising about their services, so long as the attorney's conduct
does not offend common decency. 93
"'hugged crying mothers and talked with grieving fathers of God's rewards in the
hereafter. He even sobbed along with dazed families .... Then he ... pass[ed] out
the business card of a Florida attorney... and repeatedly urge[d] them to call a
lawyer.'" Id. (citations omitted).
The court recalled that after Pan American Flight 103 crashed, one victim's
widow noted that she was solicitated by at least 30 attorneys within one day of the
crash. See id. at 451, 599 A.2d at 1266-67.
The Anis court also cited an incident where a mother, whose son suffered brain
damage from a car accident, received a letter that stated, "How much money would
you like to get out of this case?" See id., 599 A.2d at 1267, The court-noted that the
envelope contained a police report and the attorney's business card. See id. Moreover, the justices observed that this letter was one of three that she received from lawyers within two weeks of her child's accident. See id.
See id. at 456, 599 A.2d at 1269. The First through Tenth Amendments comprise the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 7, § 10.2, at 331; see also supra note 14 (setting forth the text of the First
Amendment). The United States Supreme Court has adopted a theory of selective
incorporation, whereby the Fourteenth Amendment makes certain provisions of the
Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, applicable to the states. See NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 7, § 10.2, at 332. In relevant part, the Fourteenth Amendment
states that
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
90 See Anis, 126 N.J. at 456, 599 A.2d at
1269.
91 See id. The court explained that the profession is
charged with certain responsibilities and that a high sense of honor must be imposed. See id. The court acknowledged that the days of the barrister were gone, but stressed that the practice of
law should not be viewed "as akin to the sale of aluminum siding." Id. at 455, 599
A.2d at 1269. The justices, however, remarked that the court did not look down
upon aluminum siding salespersons, but rather that the court expected much more
from lawyers. See id.
See id. at 456, 599 A.2d at 1269. The court noted that this speech
is not protected because it is intrusive and universally condemned. See id.
See id. at 459, 599 A.2d at 1271 (citing RPC 7.1). The justices suggested that
attorney advertising may provide alternative routes of relief to lay persons who are
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The justices proclaimed that Anis violated RPC 7.3(b) (1) when
he solicited legal representation because he knew or should have
known that the potential client could not use reasonable judgment in
employing counsel." In making this determination, the court explained that an objective standard attaches to the rule. 95 The court
speculated that a reasonable attorney should realize that a solicitation received the day after delivery of a death notice would reach a
person when he was unable to exercise reasonable judgment in selecting a lawyer.96
The majority refrained from defining exactly what constitutes an
offense of common decency.9 Instead, the supreme court referred
not aware of their legal options. See id. The court surmised that even in mass disasters, general public notices in certain regions might fulfill that need without the intrusiveness of targeted solicitation. See id. (citing Linda S. Althoff, Comment, Solicitation After an Air Disaster: The Status of ProfessionalRules and ConstitutionalLimits, 54
J. AIRL. & COM. 501,520 n.119 (1988)).
See id. at 460, 599 A.2d at 1271. The court rejected Anis's argument that the
restrictions placed by RPC 7.3(b)(1) on attorney advertising were unconstitutionally
overbroad, because the overbreadth doctrine does not usually apply to commercial
speech. See id. at 458, 599 A.2d at 1270.
95 See id. at 457, 599 A.2d at 1270. The court insisted that experience solidifies
such objective expectations. See id. Furthermore, the court suggested that, even if
some recipients were not offended by such a communication, this does not rebut
general expectations that the nature of such solicitation exacerbates the distress of
victims or victims' families. See id. at 458, 599 A.2d at 1270. Moreover, the court
urged that thisstandard relieves attorneys of the burden of deciding whether potential clients would be sensitive. See id.
96 See Anis, 126 N.J. at 458, 599 A.2d at 1270. The court discerned
that even
plaintiffs' lawyers admit that individuals are vulnerable at such times. See id. at 457,
599 A.2d at 1270. The court noted that plaintiffs' attorneys criticize the "Alpert letter," a form of solicitation relied on by an airline's insurer, intended to dissuade survivors and victims' families from filing lawsuits. See id. (citing Roth, supra note 6, at
975-76). The court explained that plaintiffs' attorneys find that this letter takes advantage of persons when they are vulnerable and attempts to get these persons to
settle for less than they might have recovered from a lawsuit. See id. (citing Roth,
supra note 6, at 976-77).
See id. at 460, 599 A.2d 1271. The court surmised that it may be more challenging in other cases to determine what constitutes "ethical propriety." See id. The
court hypothesized: "Would a truthful solicitation letter sent fifteen or thirty days
after a tragic loss reach people when they are no longer emotionally weak or vulnerable?" Id. The court replied that it could not answer that question with certainty
because the court's assumptions in such matters are largely untested. See id. The
court opined that there may be degrees of suffering or loss. See id. The justices explained that "common sense" told them that mildly injured survivors of a bus accident might not be as vulnerable as the Lockerbie families. See id.
The court also acknowledged that whatever lines are drawn may be economically disadvantageous to New Jersey attorneys in relation to unregulated attorneys
from other jurisdictions. See id. The justices observed that the court could not,
however, establish lawyer discipline at the lowest denominator of ethics. See id. The
court mentioned that attorneys from other states are subject to the RPCs when they

practice in NewJersey. See id.
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this task to the CAA." The court declared that, pending the CAA's
investigation and in order to give lawyers guidance, it would not impose discipline for truthful solicitation mailings sent more than fourteen days after the disaster and loss had become known.9
Concurring, Justice Handler expressed concern with the
majority's interpretation of RPC 7.3. '00 Justice Handler interpreted
the focus of RPC 7.3 to rest principally on the lawyer's state of mind
at the time of the solicitation and indirectly on the presumed mental
' The justice urged that the
or emotional condition of the recipient.ui
court should not suggest that the crux of the misconduct proscribed
under RPC 7.3 is a lack of decency."2
The concurring opinion acknowledged that commercial speech
of lawyers may be restricted "only to advance a substantial governmental interest and only through means that directly advance that interest.' 0 s Justice Handler suggested that the state does not have an
interest in preventing lawyers from engaging in solicitation that
merely offends common decency." Justice Handler proposed that a
substantial interest might instead be couched in terms of protecting
vulnerable persons from lawyers who try to solicit employment and

See id. The court suggested that the CAA might conduct an informational
hearing during which comments would be elicited from the concerned public. See
id.
99 See id. The court qualified this determination by stating that the rule
will only
be applied absent case-specific indications to the attorney that the victim's family
could not use reasonable judgment in selecting anconcurring).
attorney. See id.
100See id. at 462, 599 A.2d at 1272 (Handler,J,
See id. at 462-63, 599 A.2d at 1272 (Handler, J., concurring). The concurrence
noted that the comment to RPC 7.3 provides that the purpose of the rule is to avert
social harms, such as overreaching and harassment, and that the conditions under
which the solicitation is initiated should be contemplated in determining whether a
violation has occurred. See id. at 462, 599 A.2d at 1272 (Handler, J., concurring).
102 See id. at 464, 599 A.2d at 1273 (Handler, J., concurring).
Justice Handler,
however, did not read the majority's holding to suggest that common decency is a
determinative factor in assessing a lawyer's conduct that implicates commercial
speech. See id. at 463, 599 A.2d at 1273 (Handler, J., concurring). Instead, Justice
Handler found that the majority's opinion centered on the need to protect potential
clients from certain harmful behavior. See id.
103 Id. at.464, 599 A.2d at 1273 (Handler,J., concurring).
104 See Anis, 126 N.J. at 464, 599 A.2d at 1273 (Handler, J., concurring).
Justice
Handler noted that the United States Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinay Counse4 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985), and the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re
Felmeister & Isaacs, 104 N.J. 515, 547-48, 518 A.2d 188, 204-05 (1986), rejected a dignity standard. See Anis, 126 N.J. at 464, 599 A.2d at 1273 (Handler, J., concurring).
Justice Handler surmised that a rule that could be perceived to prohibit indecency
lacks the clarity of purpose required to sustain the protections that commercial
speech are afforded. See id.
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the state's
duty to protect the right of privacy of persons facing a
5
tragedy. 1
B. In re Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna, Reitman & Greenstein
(TEAMLAW); In re Oleckna; In re Meaden; In re Eisdorfer
On March 23, 1994, shortly before midnight, a gas line explosion devastated the Durham Woods apartment complex in Edison,
New Jersey, displacing all of its 1,500 residents.'6 Many people lost
all of their possessions. 0 7 The victims of the blast sought refuge at an
105See Anis, 126 N.J. at 467, 599 A.2d at 1275 (Handler, J., concurring).

106 See In reTEAMLAW, 155 N.J. 357, 361, 715 A.2d
216, 217 (1998) (per curiam).
A transcontinental underground pipeline, located 500 feet from the Durham Woods
Apartments, ruptured and exploded. SeeJim O'Neill, $12 Million Paid Out in Gas
Pipe Explosion: Many Edison Tenants Settle Property Claims, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
Aug. 2, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter O'Neill, $12 Million]. The 10,000-mile-long pipeline,
36 inches in diameter, carried natural gas from Texas to New England. See Anthony
A. Gallotto, First Suits Are Filed in Disaster,STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 25, 1994,
at 19; Jim O'Neill, Edison Blast Payouts Top $50 Million: Texas Eastern Settles Lawsuits
Even Before Liability Determined, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 28, 1997, at 25
[hereinafter O'Neill, Edison Blast].
The natural gas erupted into intense flames, which caused additional fires in
the complex. See O'Neill, $12 Million, supra, at 1. The blast shot an intense orange
fireball hundreds of feet into the sky. See Anthony A. Gallotto, Durham Woods Survivors Press for a Settlement: More Than 200 Claim Loss, Emotional Injuy, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.),,Mar. 24, 1998, at 19 [hereinafter Gallotto, Pressfor a Settlement]. A
pilot on a flight to LaGuardia Airport thought that someone had "nuked Newark."
See Reginald Roberts et al., Explosion Triggers Huge Fireballin Edison: Residents Flee into
the Streets as Major Gas Pipeline Ruptures, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 24, 1994,
at 1. In fact, the flames were visible forty miles away, and the rumbling noise could
be heard for miles. See id.
No criminal charges were filed, due to insufficient evidence of fault. See Grand
Jury Finds No Crimes Committed in Edison Blast, RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.), July 27,
1996, at A3. NewJersey Attorney General Peter Vemiero speculated that the pipeline may have been damaged in the 1960s when work on such pipelines was unregulated. See id.
The blast destroyed eight of the 63 buildings at the complex. See TEAMLAW,
155 N.J. at 361, 715 A.2d at 217. The blast also incinerated trees, cars, and playground equipment. See Gallotto, Pressfor a Settlement, supra, at 29. The fire was so
hot that it melted the tires and chrome on some of the automobiles in the parking
lot. See Roberts et al., supra, at 1. In fact, four years after the accident, "a thick stand
of tall, charred trees" still remained at the complex. See Gallotto, Pressfor a Settlement, supra, at 19.
No one was killed directly by the blast. See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 361, 715 A.2d
at 217. More than 100 persons were injured, most suffering foot burns and minor
cuts as they fled. See Gallotto, Pressfor a Settlement supra at 29. A 32-year-old woman
from a nearby apartment complex died of heart failure after she rushed to Durham
Woods to see what had happened. See Anthony A. Gallotto & Jonathan Jaffe, Lives
Still Shaken by Edison Gas Blast 4 Years Later: Firm Says Settlement Could Top $5 7 Million,
STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar. 22, 1998, at 23.
107 See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 361, 715 A.2d at 217. Residents lost personal items
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emergency shelter established by the Red Cross in Edison High
School, and they also sought refuge in local hotels.'"
Several New Jersey attorneys approached the victims of the explosion as potential clients.'09 Kenneth S. Oleckna and his law firm,
Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna, Reitman & Greenstein
(TEAMLAW), parked a mobile office, bearing firm advertisements,
outside the Red Cross shelter."0 Another attorney, Raymond Eisdorfer was invited into the Red Cross shelter by a friend and former client."' Eisdorfer spoke to a group of victims regarding their legal
remedies and signed twenty-six retainer agreements."' Finally, ansuch as favorite family photographs, antique furniture, and jewelry. See O'Neill, $12
mi//ion, supra note 106, at 1. Other victims of the blast lost all their computer records. SeeJim O'Neill, Edison B/as, supra note 106, at 25. One man, who had spent
years working toward a doctorate, lost all of his research. See id.
10s See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 361, 715 A.2d at 218. The cafeteria of Edison
High
School was converted into a dining area, and the gymnasium was turned into a living
and sleeping area. See id. The atmosphere in the Red Cross shelter was described as
chaotic with victims appearing distraught, scared, and disoriented. See id.
"0 See
id.
11 See id. at 365-66, 715 A.2d at 220. On March 24, 1994, Kenneth Oleckna, a
partner in the law firm TEAMLAW, learned of the explosion at Durham Woods. See
id. at 365, 715 A.2d at 220. The following day, Oleckna and TEAMLAW rented a
recreational vehicle (RV) and parked it 100 feet from the Red Cross shelter. See id.
By 9:00 p.m. Oleckna left because no one had called. See id.
On March 26, 1994, Oleckna returned to the mobile office after his firm received two calls from clients who were unable to visit the firm's principal office. See
id. Oleckna taped several advertisements for his firm to the windows of his RV. See
id'. at 365-66, 715 A.2d at 220. Oleckna also brought with him toiletry kits supplied by
his firm. See id. at 366, 715 A.2d at 220. He handed these kits out to clients with
whom he met in the mobile office. See id. Before Oleckna left for the day, he left
the remaining toiletry kits on a table in the shelter. See id. The kits did not indicate
that they were supplied by TEAMLAW. See id.
The following day, Oleckna was contacted by the Edison Police Department, instructing him to remove the vehicle, or it would be towed. See id. Oleckna moved
the RV to Durham Woods and parked it next to a trailer being used by insurance
adjusters to take releases and pay residents. See id. Oleckna was again forced to
move the mobile office, so he drove the vehicle home. See id.
On March 28, 1994, he drove the RV back to Durham Woods to handle numerous telephone inquiries that TEAMLAW received in response to the advertisement it
placed in the Sunday newspapers. See id. Paralegals from the mobile office were
dispatched to the client's apartments to take care of paperwork and to gather information. See itd. On the following day, TEAMLAW returned the RV to the lessor. See
id.
I See id. at 371, 15 A.2d at 222-23. On March 25, 1994, Raymond Eisdorfer
learned of the blast from Raphael Londono, a close personal friend and former client, who resided in Durham Woods. See id. Londono invited Eisdorfer into the Red
Cross shelter to speak to a small group of people concerning their legal remedies.
See id.
112 See id. at 371-72, 715 A.2d at 223. On March 25, 1994,
Eisdorfer met with the
group in the shelter. See id. at 371, 715 A.2d at 223. Some group members claimed
that they knew Eisdorfer would handle their claims even before the meeting. See id.
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other attorney, Charles E. Meaden solicited victims of the blast seeking shelter at the Red
Roof Inn and sent follow-up letters to those
3
with whom he met."
After several articles reported that attorneys were "preying"
upon the victims, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered the CAA to
investigate." 4 Four attorneys,"' including Oleckna, Eisdorfer, and
Other members of the group contended that they met with Eisdorfer to make a decision about their legal representation. See id.
The meeting lasted approximately an hour and a half. See id. The principal
concern of the group was to obtain legal counsel before conversing with insurance
company representatives. See id.
During the meeting, a Red Cross official asked Eisdorfer to leave because attorneys were not allowed in the shelter. See id. Londono objected and explained that
he had asked Eisdorfer into the shelter to talk to the group. See id. The official replied that the group could not meet in the shelter and volunteered to provide
transporation to another site for the group. See id. Eisdorfer agreed to leave, however, he remained in the shelter for an additional 30 minutes until a police officer
asked him to leave. See id. at 371-72, 715 A.2d at 223.
By June 17, 1994, Eisdorfer represented 222 Durham Woods residents, almost
none of whom he had represented before the explosion. See id. at 372, 715 A.2d at
223. Eisdorfer claimed that the clients were referred by members of the group with
whom he met at the shelter. See id.
11 See id. at 374-75, 715 A.2d at 224-25. On the day following the explosion,
Charles Meaden drove to Edison to solicit clients. See id., 715 A.2d at 224. While at a gas
station, he introduced himself to Ariv Kahn as an attorney. See id. at 375, 715 A.2d at
224. Kahn then disclosed to Meaden that his girlfriend was a victim of the blast and
that she was temporarily staying at the Red Roof Inn and might be interested in retaining counsel. See id. Meaden went with Kahn to the hotel. See id. Meaden presented Kahn's girlfriend with a retainer agreement and his card, but she made it
clear that she was not interested in hiring Meaden. See id.
Meaden then went to the hotel lobby to make phone calls. See id. A man, who
was visibly upset, sat down and talked to Meaden about the effect that the blast had
on him and about his injured wife. See id., 715 A.2d at 224-25; Thomas Zambito,
Lawyer Reprimandedfor Conduct After Blast, RECORD (Hackensack, N.J.), May 14, 1997,
at Al (stating that the man began to cry as he discussed the blast). Meaden gave the
man his card and told-the man that he may follow up with written correspondence.
See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 375, 715 A.2d at 225.
In total, Meaden spent several hours at the Red Roof Inn. See id. He distributed his card to four or five individuals and gathered a list of sixteen prospective clients. See id. On the following day, Meaden drafted a letter to be mailed to the people on his list. See id. The letters were sent on the sixth day after the blast. See id.
These letters were intercepted by the Red Cross and handed over to the OAE. See
Dana Coleman, Solicitation Case; A ChangingRule?, N.J. LAw., Mar. 23, 1998, at 1.
14 See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at
361, 715 A.2d at 218.
15 See id. at 361-62, 715 A.2d at 218. Included
in this group of four was Samuel
Convery, a former mayor of Edison, who met with potential clients at the shelter at
the request of Indian community leaders. See Henry Gottlieb, Pipeline Scorecard:
Three Cleared, One Scolded, N.J. L.J., May 19, 1997, at 4. Many of the victims of the
Durham Woods explosion were of Indian descent. See id. Indian community leaders, who knew Convery, invited him to the Red Cross shelter. See id. At the shelter,
one Indian leader distributed Convery's business cards. See id. Also, at the request
of Indian leaders, Convery met with potential clients at the emergency shelter. See
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Meaden, and the law firm TEAMLAW were subsequently charged
with violating RPC 7.3(b) (1).116 In addition, Meaden was charged
with violating RPC 7.3(b) (4) .1 The CAA reprimanded Oleckna,"8
TEAMIAW," and Eisdorfer" ° for violating RPC 7.3(b) (1) and suspended Meaden 2 ' for three months for violations of RPC 7.3(b) (1)
and RPC 7.3(b) (4).'2
id.
The CAA dismissed the charges against Convery. See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at
362, 715 A.2d at 218. The CAA reasoned that, because there was no prior decisional
law on the subject, there could be no finding of misconduct. See Gottlieb, supra, at
4. The DRB agreed with the CAA, and the OAE did not petition the New Jersey Supreme Court for review. See TEAMAW, 155 N.J. at 362, 715 A.2d at 218.
116 See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 361-62, 715 A.2d at 218. At the time of solicitations,
RPC 7.3(b) (1) provided:
A lawyer shall not contact, or send a written communication to, a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment
if:
(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical,
emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could
not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer ....
Id. at 362, 715 A.2d at 218 (quoting N.J. RuLEs Rule 7.3(b)(1)).
"7 See id. at 361-62, 715 A.2d at 218. At the time
of Meaden's solicitations and
mailings, RPC 7.3(b) (4) provided:
A lawyer shall not contact, or send a written communication to, a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment
if: ...
(4) the communication involves direct contact with a prospective
client concerning a specific event when such contact has pecuniary
gain as a significant motive except that a lawyer may send a letter by
mail to a prospective client in such circumstances provided that the
letter:
(i) bears the word "ADVERTISEMENT". . . and
(ii) contains the following notice.. . "Before making your choice
of attorney, you should give this matter careful thought. . ."; and
(iii) contains an additional notice [that if the letter is misleading,
the recipient may report the attorney to the CAA].
Id. at 362, 715 A.2d at 218 (quoting N.J. RULES Rule 7.3(b) (4)) (alterations in original).
Il8 See id. at 366, 715 A.2d at 220. The CAA decided that Oleckna violated RPC
7.3(b)(1) because he demonstrated an intent to target and initiate contact with victims when he parked a mobile office bearing advertisements for the firm near the
emergency shelter. See id.
1
See id. The CAA recommended that TEAMLAW also be held responsible because the firm made the decision to use a mobile office. See id.; see also supra note 70
(recognizing that a law firm can be held responsible for transgressing ethical rules).
See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 372, 715 A.2d at 223. Although the CAA found that
Eisdorfer violated RPC 7.3(b)(1), it recommended that he be reprimanded instead
of given a three-month suspension because of a paucity of prior decisional law. See
id.
121 See id. at 375, 715 A.2d at 225. With respect to Meaden,
the CAA found that
he violated RPC 7.3(b) (1) and RPC 7.3(b) (4) for approaching Kahn's girlfriend, by
initiating contact with the visibly upset man, and for sending targeted, direct-mail
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The DRB examined the matter and concluded that Meaden
should be reprimanded, not suspended,' and that the charges
against the remaining attorneys and TEAMLAW should be dismissed. 1 4 The OAE disagreed with the DRB's 5 findings and petitioned the NewJersey Supreme Court for review.
On February 3, 1998, the NewJersey Supreme Court granted the
petition for review in order to determine whether the attorneys and
the law firm violated the RPCs."6 Prior to the court's analysis, the justices set forth RPC 7.3(b)(1) and RPC 7.3(b)(4) as they read at the
time of the solicitations and mailings at issue. 2 The supreme court
recognized that an objective standard attaches to RPC 7.3(b) (1).'2"
solicitation letters. See id.
1
See id. at 361-62, 715 A.2d at 218.
123 See id. at 376, 715 A.2d at 225. With respect to Meaden,
the DRB concluded
that there was insufficient evidence that Meaden violated RPC 7.3(b) (1) through his
contact with Kahn's girlfriend. See id. at 375, 715 A.2d at 225. The DRB reasoned
that the rule itself and decisional law did not offer sufficient guidance regarding the
limits of solicitation. See id. The DRB decided, however, that there was sufficient
evidence to conclude that his encounter with the visibly upset man violated RPC
7.3(b) (1) and that his mailing violated RPC 7.3(b)(4). See id. at 375-76, 715 A.2d at
225. The two dissenting members of the DRB, however, found that his actions were
not egregious enough to justify any discipline. See id. at 376, 715 A.2d at 225.
24 See id. at 362, 715 A.2d at 218. With respect to Oleckna
and TEAMLAW, the
DRB distinguished Anis and noted that, in the present matter, the mere presence of
advertisements on an RV could not suffice to make the victims feel overwhelmed,
importuned, or pressured into engaging in an unwanted professional relationship.
See id. at 366, 715 A.2d at 220 (citing In re Anis, 126 NJ. 448, 599 A.2d 1265 (1992)
(per curiam)); see also supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion in Anis). Furthermore, the DRB maintained that there was no indication that Oleckna and TEAMLAW knew or should have known that the residents
were so distressed that they were unable to exercise reasonable judgment in hiring
an attorney. TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 366-67, 715 A.2d at 220. Three dissenting
members of the DRB wanted to reprimand Oleckna and his firm on the ground that
the advertisements on the mobile office were a type of solicitation. See id. at 367, 715
A.2d at 220. One of the dissenters suggested that the presence of a mobile office at
an emergency shelter should be banned altogether. See id.
The DRB dismissed the charges against Eisdorfer. See id. at 372, 715 A.2d at
223. The DRB observed that Eisdorfer had been invited into the shelter. See id.
Furthermore, Eisdorfer did not identify himself as a lawyer to the other victims in
the shelter, and the noise level in the shelter was so high that other victims could not
overhear his conversations. See id. The DRB did not consider his refusal to leave the
shelter when asked as an aggravating factor because his client, Londono, and the
remaining members of the group wanted him to stay. See id. The Board agreed with
Eisdorfer that if he were disciplined for refusing to leave the Red Cross shelter the
group's and his assembly rights would be violated. See id.; see also supra note 16
(discussing the First Amendment right to group association).
1
See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 362, 715 A.2d at 218.
126 See
id.
1
See id.; see also supra notes 116, 117 (reproducing text of RPC 7.3(b)(1) and
RPC 7.3(b) (4) prior to amendment). The TEAMLAWcourt noted that, pursuant to
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In re TEAMLA W, In re Oleckna

The court analyzed the conduct of Oleckna and TEAMIAW together.'" The justices found that both Oleckna and TEAMLAW vioOleckna and
lated RPC 7.3(b) (1) and imposed a reprimand.'"
TEAMLAW set forth several arguments in their defense. 3' These respondents contended that the fourteen-day temporal ban crafted in
Anis did not apply because the Durham Woods victims lacked severe
injuries. 3 2 The court, however, rejected this contention and deter-

the ruling in Anis, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted an amendment to RPC
7.3(b); however, the court noted that the amendment was not applicable to this matter because the amendment was adopted subsequent to these facts. See TEAMLAW,
155 N.J. at 363 n.1, 715 A.2d at 219 n.1; see also supra note 71 (reproducing text of
RPC 7.3(b) subsequent to amendment); supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text
(discussing the Anis court's decision to refer the rule-making process to the CAA).
128 See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 363, 715 A.2d at 219; see
also supra notes 94-96 and
accompanying text (discussing the objective standard that attaches to RPC
7.3(b) (1)).
12
See TEAMLAW, 155 NJ. at 367, 715 A.2d at 220-21.
's See id. at 370-71,715 A.2d at 222.
131 See id. at 367-70, 715 A.2d at 221-22. The respondents argued that they
offered
a valuable legal service by providing the victims with information pertaining to their
legal rights and remedies. See id. at 369, 715 A.2d at 222 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 458 (1978)). The justices acknowledged that victims
and their families are often prey to insurance claims adjusters, who are eager to get
cheap and quick settlements. See id. (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459 n.16). The
court articulated, however, that a lawyer is not prohibited from providing information regarding legal rights and remedies to these individuals, but rather that a lawyer
is prohibited from using that information as bait to obtain a retainer agreement. See
id. (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458).
The court also disagreed with respondents' contention that they were engaged
in activity protected by the First Amendment when they parked the RV, bearing firm
advertisements, outside of the shelter. See id. The justices observed that ordinarily
lawyers may not be punished for using printed advertisements that contain truthful
and non-deceptive information to solicit business, even if the advertisement contains
information concerning a specific legal problem. See id. at 369-70, 715 A.2d at 222
(citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)). The
court explained, however, that a "state may place 'reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, and manner of advertising."' Id. at 370, 715 A.2d at 222 (quoting Bates
v. Arizona Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977)).
The court observed that the placement of the RV with advertisements attached
to it constituted conduct that consisted of both non-expressive and expressive elements. See id. The New Jersey Supreme Court recalled that in United States v.
O'Brien, the United States Supreme Court held, "'[W]hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.'" Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376 (1968)) (alteration in original).
132 See id. at 367, 715 A.2d at 221.
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mined that the fourteen-day ban applied to all post-accident or postdisaster solicitations.Iss
These respondents further argued that there was insufficient
evidence that the victims were, in fact, emotionally traumatized and
unable to make reasonable decisions about retaining counsel.1s4 The
court responded that the standard delineated in Anis was an objective
one and that actual knowledge of the victim's emotional state is unnecessary.'3 The justices concluded that a reasonably prudent attorney should have known that the Durham Woods victims could not
have exercised reasonable judgment concerning legal representation.'36
In See id. at 367-68, 715 A.2d at 221. In making this decision, the court rejected
Oleckna's and TEAMILAW's attempt to distinguish the cases based on the severity of
the victims' injuries. See id. at 367, 715 A.2d at 221 (citing Florida Bar v. Went for It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995)). Respondents contended that the residents of Durham Woods had "suffered, for the most part, no physical injury and were faced
'merely' with dispossession and loss of all their earthly belongings." Id. Oleckna
and TEAMLAW maintained that these victims could make clear and reasoned
judgments regarding their legal representation. See id.
The court acknowledged that the Durham Woods disaster did not involve numerous deaths, as did Anis. See id. The court stated, however, that when there has
been a disaster, it will not draw lines on the basis of severity of injury. See id. (citing
Went for It, 515 U.S. at 633). The court posited that victims of the Durham Woods
blast, fresh from losing their personal belongings, cars, and apartments, were not in
a state of mind conducive to making sensible judgments about legal representation.
See id. at 367-68, 715 A.2d at 221. Thus, the court decided that the 14-day ban
crafted in Anis was applicable to all disaster (or post-accident) solicitations. See id. at
368, 715 A.2d at 221. The justices noted that there are no less burdensome alternatives to this 14-day proscription on direct, targeted solicitation. See id. (citing Went
for It, 315 U.S. at 634). The court further noted that there were alternate channels
for obtaining information regarding legal representation during the 14-day period
following disasters. See id. (citing Wentfor It, 515 U.S. at 634).
134 See id.
Respondents argued that there was no evidence that the Durham
Woods victims were emotionally traumatized and pointed out that many victims were
eager to obtain the advice of counsel. See id. The court, however, insisted that proof
of such harm was not necessary under the objective standard that the New Jersey
Supreme Court attached to Rule 7.3 (b) (1) in Anis. See id. (citing In reAnis, 126 N.J.
448, 457, 599 A.2d 1265, 1270 (1992) (per curiam)).
135 See TEAMLAW, 155 NJ. at 368, 715 A.2d at 221 (citing
Anis, 126 N.J. at 457,
599 A.2d at 1270). The justices suggested that the respondents had proper notice of
the objective standard and that their actions failed to comply with this standard. See
id. at 369, 715 A.2d at 222; see also supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text
(explaining the objective standard that attaches to RPC 7.3(b)(1)).
I See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 368, 715 A.2d at 221. The court justified the objective standard on the basis that uninvited legal counsel may distress the solicited victim simply because of the attorney's obtrusiveness and invasion into the victim's privacy, even when other harm does not materialize. See id. (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
465-66). Furthermore, the court remarked that the effectiveness of the state's effort
to impede such harm to potential clients would be greatly diminished if the state,
having proved a solicitation, were required to prove the additional element of an
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In re Meaden

The New Jersey Supreme Court found that Meaden violated
RPC 7.3(b) (1) and RPC 7.3(4) .37 The court identified two distinct
actions taken by Meaden that constituted violations of RPC
7.3(b) ( 1 ). 'ss First, the justices noted that Meaden went to the Red
Roof Inn to initiate contact with a victim in order to gain professional
employment. s9 The court stressed that, two days after the disaster,
the victim was not able to exercise the reasonable judgment necessary
to employ an attorney.'
Second, the court observed that Meaden violated RPC 7.3(b) (1)
when he handed out a business card to a visibly distressed victim and
told the victim that he would follow up with further written communication.14 ' The court found that it was not necessary to apply the objective standard delineated in Anis because Meaden had actual
knowledge of the victim's mental state. 142 Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the follow-up letter sent to that victim
was not in compliance with the guidelines for solicitation letters

actual injury. See id. (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466). The court recognized that frequently there is no witness besides the attorney and the victim whom he has solicited
and that this makes it impossible, or at least difficult, to obtain proof of what actually
happened. See id. (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466). Hence, the justices concluded
that the absence of explicit findings or proof of injury or harm is immaterial. See id.
(citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468).
Furthermore, the court found that respondents' conduct reduced the practice
of law to the "high-pressured pushing of legal services as a commodity onto susceptible and vulnerable customers, ill-equipped to protect their own interests." Id. at 36869, 715 A.2d at 221. The justices proclaimed that NewJersey has a "'legitimate and
important interest'" in preventing this type of vexatious conduct. See id. at 369, 715
A.2d at 221 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462). The justices criticized the DRB for
asking whether the advertisements made the victims feel overwhelmed, importuned,
or pressured into entering an unwanted professional relationship instead of applyin the objective standard that attaches to RPC 7.3(b) (1). See id., 715 A.2d at 221-22.
See id. at 376, 715 A.2d at 225.
138 See id.
139 See id. Although the court agreed with the DRB's decision
to discipline Meaden, the court found that Meaden also violated RPC 7.3(b) (1) through his contact
with Khan's girlfriend. See id. The justices determined that, like all victims seeking
shelter at the Red Roof Inn, Khan's girlfriend was not sufficiently able to exercise
reasonable judgment in employing legal counsel. See id. The majority stated that
the fact that Khan's girlfriend was mentally stable enough to refuse Meaden's offer
of representation did not change the court's determination that RPC 7.3(b) (1) was
violated. See id.
140 Seeid.
4' See id.
1
See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 376, 715 A.2d at 225. The court emphasized that
Meaden knew that the victim was clearly distraught and was unable to use reasonable
judgment in selecting a lawyer to represent him. See id.
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found in RPC 7.3(b) (4)."' The supreme court ruled that, because
Meaden acknowledged his violations of RPC 7.3(b) (1) and RPC
7.3(b) (4), discipline was warranted in the form of a reprimand.'"
3.

In re Eisdorfer

The court ruled that Eisdorfer violated RPC 7.3(b) (1) and imposed a reprimand.' The justices remarked that, because Eisdorfer
went to the Red Cross shelter with the intent to obtain employment,
RPC 7.3(b)(1) applied to his actions, despite the fact that he was invited there.'46 The New Jersey Supreme Court focused on the loca7 and determined that Eisdorfer's
tion and timing of his meeting"1
conduct constituted contact with potential clients when he should

See id.
See id. at 377, 715 A.2d at 225.
145 See id. at 374, 715 A.2d at 224. The justices rejected Eisdorfer's
argument that
his and the group's association rights were violated. See id. at 373-74, 715 A.2d at
223-24. Further, the court labeled Eisdorfer's speech a proposed commercial transaction rather than highly protected political association or expression. See id.,
715
A.2d at 224 (citing In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 437-38 (1978)). The court recognized
that collective action that is undertaken to obtain access to the courts is a fundamental right that is protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 373, 715 A.2d at 22-24
(citing Primus,436 U.S. at 426; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963)). The
justices remarked, however, that the rulings in cases recognizing this fundamental
right were premised on the fact that "'no monetary stakes [we] re involved, and so
there [wa]s no danger that the attorney w[ould] desert or subvert the paramount
interests of his client to enrich himself.'" Id.at 373, 714 A.2d at 224 (quoting Button,
371 U.S. at 443) (alterations in original). The NewJersey Supreme Court noted that
the United States Supreme Court explicitly excepted from protected forms of group
association situations in which the income of the attorney is contingent upon the
sum recovered in a particular case. See id. (citing Primus, 436 U.S. at 436 n.30).
The court suggested that Eisdorfer's conduct bordered on the improper practice of running. See id. at 374, 715 A.2d at 224. The court pointed out that misconduct based on "running" continues to be a professional and public concern. See id.
Although Londono was not compensated for setting up the group meeting with Eisdorfer, the court recognized that the close interaction between Londono and Eisdorfer sparked identical concerns to those that justify the court's proscription of
"running." See id.
14 See id. at 372, 715 A-2d
at 223.
147 See id. at 372-73, 715 A.2d at 223. The court
commented that
to conduct a legal seminar in the sleeping area of an emergency shelter a day after a massive explosion displacing hundreds is conduct that
"provide[s] a one-sided presentation and [ ] encourage[s] speedy and
perhaps uninformed decisionmaking [without] opportunity for intervention or counter-education by agencies of the Bar, supervisory
authorities, or persons close to the solicited individual."
Id. at 373, 715 A.2d at 223 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
457 (1978)) (alterations in original).
"'
1
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have known that the victims could not use reasonable judgment in
hiring an attorney."
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice O'Hern
agreed that the actions of Oleckna, TEAMLAW, and Eisdorfer violated RPC 7.3(b)(1).I4 Still, the justice objected to the sanctions imposed by the majority because the New Jersey Supreme Court had
not previously determined that the particular actions that these respondents took were in violation of the RPC.' 50 Justice O'Hern explained that the court usually 5applies clarifications of professional responsibility law prospectively.' '

Moreover, Justice O'Hern asserted that Anis was factually distinguishable because Anis concerned targeted, direct-mail solicitation"
148
See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 372, 715 A.2d at 223. The court noted that Eisdorfer did not call attention to the fact that he was an attorney to others in the shelter,
nor did anyone outside the group meeting overhear what was going on. See id.
149
See id. at 377, 715 A.2d at 225-26 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissent-

ing in part).
50 See id., 715 A.2d at 226 (O'Hern,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
First, Justice O'Hern questioned how the majority could apply the principles of law
announced in Anis to the matter, particularly when the DRB decided that the application of the RPCs to this case would be unfair, given the shortage of prior decisional law. See id. at 378, 715 A.2d at 226 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Hern referred to the DRB as one of the most respected
ethical bodies and noted that the DRB was the body responsible for the imposition
of discipline on attorneys. See id. The justice suggested that if the DRB failed to believe that the RPCs were adequately clear to impose discipline, it is the supreme
court's responsibility to clear up the confusion and not to pretend that the subject
matter was perfectly clear. See id.
. See id. at 379, 715 A.2d at 227 (O'Hern,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in
part) (citing In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 630, 635-36, 449 A.2d 483, 497, 500 (1982)
(finding that fairness requires prospective application of the court's interpretation
of DR 7-107(d), because it was the first time that the court addressed the issue); In re
Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 660, 449 A.2d 505, 513 (1982) (stating that the prospective
application was appropriate because the court's duty is to shape disciplinary rules,
the object of which is to improve the legal profession and to protect the public,
rather than to punish)).
152 See id. at 378, 715 A.2d at 226 (O'Hern,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in
part). Justice O'Hern recalled that at the time that Anis was decided, the law was
unsettled. See id. Justice O'Hern mentioned that when Anis was decided, the New
Jersey Supreme Court speculated that the United States Supreme Court would permit a ban meant to prevent such an intrusion upon the dignity and privacy of individuals. See id. The opinion noted that the Supreme Court did permit restraints on
targeted, direct-mail solicitation of disaster victims in WentforIL See id.; see also supra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515
U.S. 618 (1995)). Justice O'Hern stated that the issue was decided in a five to four
decision. See 7TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 378, 715 A.2d at 226 (O'Hern,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The justice remarked that New Jersey's own CAA at
first refused to enact a rule that prohibited direct solicitation of disaster victims. See
id. Justice O'Hern also observed that the current RPC 7.3, which was drafted by the
supreme court, did not take effect until approximately five years after the Anis deci-
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Justice O'Hern also noted that, despite the plea of the Anis court, the
CAA had not promulgated guidelines that explain the regulations on
written
advertisements directed at vulnerable lay persons by law155
yers.
Based on notions of fairness, the justice contended that
Oleckna, TEAMLAW, and Eisdorfer should not be disciplined! Justice O'Hern's opinion noted that this was the first time the supreme
court had clarified the Anis ruling 5 Thejustice stressed that it is the
court's responsibility to ensure that all attorneys are aware of the applicable RPC in advance when there is a conflict between the principles of professional responsibility and the First Amendment.'5 6

C. In re Pajerowski
Patrick M. Pajerowski, in addition to many other objectionable
activities, 57 employed the use of a runner to solicit business for him
on several occasions.5
Upon review, the CAA and Pajerowski exe-

sion. See id.
15
See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 379, 715 A.2d at 226 (O'Hern,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (discussing In reAnis, 126 N.J. 448, 467, 599 A.2d 1265, 127475 (1992) (Handler, J., concurring)). Justice O'Hern recalled that Justice Handler
wanted such a rule to identify and define the conditions under which attorney solicitations will increase personal suffering or infringe on personal privacy. See id.
(discussing Anis, 126 N.J. at 467, 599 A.2d at 1274-75 (Handler, J.,concurring)).
1 See id. at 380, 715 A.2d at 227 (O'Hern,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
I5 See id.
156 See id. Justice O'Hern cautioned that lawyers "who
push the First Amendment
envelope should not be the scapegoats for institutional shortcomings." Id.
157 See In re Pajerowski, 156 N.J. 509, 511-13, 721 A.2d
992, 992-95 (1998) (per curiam). Upon review, the New Jersey Supreme Court grouped Pajerowski's conduct
into four categories: the runner cases, the loan cases, the failure to communicate
case, and the conflict of interest case. See id.; see also infra note 160 and accompanyinl text (discussing the other types of objectionable conduct).
See Pajerowski, 156 N.J. at 511-13, 721 A.2d at 992-95. The NewJersey Supreme
Court cited six specific instances in which Pajerowski employed a runner. See id.
Most notably, on December 28, 1994, Kimberlee Bartree, John Bartree, Jr., and
Chanel Churchwell were involved in a car accident. See id. at 511, 721 A.2d at 993.
Shortly thereafter, Kenneth Burgess and an unidentified individual visited the
Bartree and Churchwell residences in order to retain them as clients for Pajerowski.
See id.
Burgess sent the Bartrees to an internist for treatment, even though the two
were uninjured in the accident. See id. The intent of these referrals was to bolster
their legal claims. See id. On February 2, 1995, Pajerowski informed Kimberlee that
he would not represent her because the police report and investigation showed that
she had caused the car accident. See id. Pajerowski continued, however, to represent John and Chanel, who filed suits against Kimberlee, without notifying them of
possible conflicts of interest. See id.
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cuted a stipulation 9 of facts and discipline in which Pajerowski admitted that he had transgressed several RPCs, including RPC
7.3(b).'" The CAA recommended a three-year suspension. 6' A majority of the DRB disagreed with this discipline and instead voted to
disbar Pajerowski. 62 The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed this
matter.16s

1

See BLAcK's LAw DICIONARY

1415 (6th ed. 1990).
A stipulation is a
"[v]oluntary agreement between opposing counsel concerning disposition of some
relevant point so as to obviate [the] need for proof or to narrow [the] range of litigable issues." Id.
160 See Pajerowski, 156 N.J. at 510, 721 A.2d at 992.
In addition to violating RPC
7.3(b), Pajerowski admitted to violating the following:
RPC 1.2(a) (failing to abide by client's decision); RPC 1.3 (failing to
act with diligence); RPC 1.4(a) (failing to communicate); RPC 1.7(a),
RPC 1.7(b), and RPC 1.7(c) (representing clients with conflicts of interest); RPC 1.8(e) (providing financial assistance to client); RPC
1.80) (acquiring proprietary interest in client's cause of action); RPC
1.9 (a) (representing client with interest adverse to former client); RPC
5.3 (failing to properly supervise nonlawyer); RPC 5.4 (splitting fees
with nonlawyer); RPC 5.5 (assisting in unauthorized practice of law);
RPC 7.1(a) (providing misleading communication about lawyer's services); RPC 7.2(c) (giving value for recommending legal services); ... RPC 7.3(d) (providing compensation for recommending
lawyer's services); RPC 8.4(a) (violating Rules of Professional Conduct); and RPC 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration ofjustice).
Id. The CAA decided not to disbar Pajerowski because, in New Jersey, no attorney
had ever been disbarred solely for the use of a runner. See Michael Booth, Ambulance-ChaserDisbarmenta FirstforNewJersey, N.J. L.J., Dec. 7, 1998, at 1.
61 See Pajerowski, 156 N.J. at 510, 721 A.2d at 992.
:62 See id. The DRB agreed with the CAA that
Pajerowski violated 18 RPCs, but
disagreed on the appropriate discipline for the runner cases. See id. at 517, 721 A.2d
at 996. The DRB found that Pajerowski took advantage of victims shortly after their
accidents and disregarded their right to privacy. See id. The DRB found that Pajerowski succeeded in taking advantage of people when they were extraordinarily
vulnerable. See id. The DRB stressed that Burgess's ambulance-chasing practices
were repugnant and unsavory to the legal profession. See id. The DRB observed that
Pajerowski's conduct contributed to the negative perception that the public associates with attorneys. See id,, 721 A.2d at 996-97.
Three members of the board dissented and voted for a three-year suspension.
See id. at 518, 721 A.2d at 997. They found that Pajerowski "had not engaged in a
continuous course of misconduct that demonstrate[d] an attitude wholly inconsistent with and indifferent to ethical standards .... " Id. at 517, 721 A.2d at 997. Nor
did the dissenters find that he committed an offense that was so egregious, such as
theft, embezzlement, or bribery, such that no other form of discipline but disbarment would be appropriate. See id. at 518, 721 A.2d at 997. The dissenters stressed
Pajerowski's cooperation with disciplinary bodies, and his acknowledgment of his
violations, in determining that suspension was appropriate. See id.
1' See id. at 510, 721 A.2d at 992.
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The supreme court took notice of the fact that no attorney had
ever been disbarred solely for the use of a runner.'" The court ruled,
however, that Pajerowski's conduct violated RPC 7.3 and was so egregious that disbarment was appropriate.'6 Rather than applying the
objective standard, the justices suggested that Pajerowski did not have
knowledge, as required by the RPC, of whether the people he solicited were able to exercise reasonable judgment in employing an attorney.'66 The court reasoned that in many instances Pajerowski was
unaware of the extent of the injuries of those being solicited by his
See id. at 518-20, 721 A.2d at 997-98. The court traced the history of
runner
cases in NewJersey. See id. The court noted that in In re Frankel, a personal injury
lawyer employed a runner to solicit clients. See id. at 518, 721 A.2d at 997 (citing In
reFrankel, 20 N.J. 588, 591, 120 A.2d 603, 604 (1956)). The justices pointed out that
the Frankelcourt imposed a three-year suspension, rather than disbarment, because
Frankel was the first lawyer to be prosecuted for the use of a runner. See id. (citing
Frankel 20 NJ. at 598-99, 120 A.2d at 608). The court also recalled In relntrocaso,in
which the court imposed a three-year suspension on an attorney for the use of a
runner. See id. at 519, 721 A.2d 997-98 (citing In re Introcaso, 26 NJ. 353, 361, 140
A.2d 70, 74 (1958)). The Pajerowski court noted that the Introcasocourt's decision to
impose a reprimand was based on the facts that the lawyer's conduct occurred before the Frankeldecision and that the lawyer had an unblemished reputation. See id.
(citing Introcaso, 26 NJ. at 361, 140 A.2d at 74).
Next, the justices distinguished In re Bregg from Introcasoand FrankeL See id., 721
A.2d at 998 (citing In re Bregg, 61 NJ. 476, 478-79, 295 A.2d 360, 361 (1972) (per
curiam)). The court noted that, in Bregg, the lawyer received only a three-month
suspension because he lacked the type of hardened and studied disregard for ethical
standards and the lack of candor that was present in Frankel and Introcaso. See id.
(citing Bregg, 61 N.J. at 478-79, 295 A.2d at 361). The court next reviewed In re Shaw,
in which the lawyer was disbarred for the use of a runner, among other conduct. See
id. (citing In re Shaw, 88 NJ. 433, 437-40, 442, 443 A.2d 670, 671-74, 675 (1982) (per
curiam)). Finally, the court noted that the recent 7TAMLAWcourt condemned the
use of a runner. See id. at 520, 721 A.2d at 998 (citing TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. 357, 374,
715 A.2d 216, 224 (1998)); see also supra note 145 (discussing the TEAMLAWcourt's
opinion that Eisdorfer used a runner).
I See Pajerowski, 156 N.J. at 515, 522, 721 A.2d at 995, 999. The court also found
that he violated RPC 5.3, RPC 7.1(a), RPC 8.4(a), and RPC 8.4(d) in conjunction
with the runner cases. See id. at 515, 721 A.2d at 995. Thejustices acknowledged that
there were several mitigating factors in this matter. See id. at 514, 721 A.2d at 995.
The court noted that Pajerowski had no prior disciplinary record, cooperated with
disciplinary authorities, recognized the impropriety of his actions, and was a recovering alcoholic. See id.
In disbarring Pajerowski for the use of a runner, the court stressed that an attorney who uses a runner should not automatically be disbarred, but, rather, that the
court should consider the circumstances in each particular case. See id. at 521-22,
721 A.2d at 999. The court, however, maintained that Pajerowski's conduct was so
egregious that it "'poison[ed] the well of justice"' and constituted "'grave misconduct that goes to the heart of the administration of justice.'" Id. at 522, 721 A.2d at
999 (quoting In reVerdiramo, 96 NJ. 183, 185, 186, 475 A.2d 45, 47 (1984) (per curiam)). Thus, the court ruled that disbarment was appropriate. See id.
166 See id. at 515, 721 A.2d at 995. The court stated that in many
instances, Pajerowski was unaware of the severity of the victim's injuries. See id.
164
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runner and, therefore, could not have knowledge of their physical,
mental, or emotional well-being. 67 The court warned that conduct
similar to Pajerowski's is detrimental tojustice)8
IV
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Anis, TEAMLAW, and Pajerowski emphatically cautioned lawyers that certain types of solicitation violate RPC 7.3(b) and will not be tolerated.'6 The court, in applying RPC 7.3(b) (1), however, did not strike the right balance of the
competing interests raised by attorney solicitation of clients. Although in the recent solicitation cases the court condemned conduct
that is unarguably reprehensible, the court's application of RPC
7.3(b) failed to provide guidelines as to the permissible methods of
solicitation, an omission which is unfair to attorneys.170
First, the supreme court was inconsistent in its application of the
knowledge standard articulated in RPC 7.3(b) (1). The court applied
the objective standard of RPC 7.3(b)(1) to the conduct of Anis,
Oleckna, TEAMLAW, and Eisdorfer, while applying the actual
knowledge standard to Meaden and Pajerowski.''
Therefore, the
court has not provided lawyers with notice as to when the court will
apply the actual knowledge standard and when the court will apply
the objective standard to an attorney's conduct.
Further, the court neglected to define the actual knowledge
standard of RPC 7.3(b) (1).'72 When the court applied the actual
See id. Pajerowski contended that he did not pre-authorize Burgess's actions.
See id. The court disagreed and found that Pajerowski actually encouraged Burgess's
conduct. See id. The justices revealed that the stipulation stated that, although Pajerowski was unaware of each solicitation, he had previously authorized Burgess's
conduct and later ratified it by retaining clients and compensating Burgess. See id.
168 See id. at 522, 721 A.2d at
999.
169 See In re Anis, 126 N.J. 448, 460, 599 A.2d
1265, 1271 (1992) (per curiam);
TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 370, 372, 377, 715 A.2d at 222, 223, 225; Pajerowski, 156 N.J.
at 522, 721 A.2d at 999.
170 See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 377, 379-80, 715 A.2d at 226, 227
(O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that discipline should not be imposed
because the attorneys did not have proper notice of the type of conduct that RPC
7.3(b) (1) prohibits).
1
See Anis, 126.N.J. at 457, 599 A.2d at 1270 (applying the objective standard to
Anis's conduct); TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 368, 372, 376, 715 A.2d at 221, 223, 225
(applying the objective standard to Oleckna's, TEAMLAW's, and Eisdorfer's conduct, but applying the actual knowledge standard to Meaden's conduct); Pajerowski,
156 NJ. at 515, 721 A.2d at 995 (applying the actual knowledge standard to Pajerowski's conduct).
17
See generally TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 376, 715 A.2d at 225; Pajerowski, 156 N.J. at
515, 721 A.2d at 995. Conversely, the objective standard that is attached to RPC
7.3(b) (1) is defined by reasonableness. See generally MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L.
167
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knowledge standard, it essentially imposed a duty of inquiry upon attorneys to determine their potential client's well-being before initiating a contact." The court failed, however, to explain exactly what
this duty entails. 74 It is unjust that an attorney can be penalized for a
violation of RPC 7.3 when the court has not provided notice of what
degree of inquiry is sufficient to determine a potential client's mental, physical, or emotional state. 75
As Justice O'Hern noted in his concurrence in TEAMLAW, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has not supplied the legal profession with
guidance as to what the law is and how an ethical matter might be
decided.'Y6 Surely, this type of decision-making does not assure lawyers that decisions concerning their conduct will not be made arbitrarily. Further, the recent applications of RPC 7.3(b) (1) have the
potential to chill a lawyer's First Amendment rights to group association, freedom of expression, and freedom to speak truthfully about
his services because a lawyer does not know what is expected of
him. 77 This, in turn, undermines the objective of providing members of the public with information about legal services and their leBecause the solicitation restrictions implicate the First
gal rights.'
Amendment's expressive rights of both attorneys and clients, the
void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that the court construe the rule
narrowly in such a way that individuals are put on notice of what behavior is acceptable and that expressive rights are not unduly curtailed.'" At the same time, this chilling effect protects the privacy
Indeed, an introductory
level torts class teaches first year law students what it means to be reasonably prudent, which is the objective standard in RPC 7.3(b)(1). See id.
173 See Interview with Bernard K. Freamon, Esq., Counsel to Charles E. Meaden,
in Newark, N.J. (Feb. 19, 1999). Professor Freamon is an expert on attorney ethics
and teaches Professional Responsibility at Seton Hall University School of Law.
174 See
id.
175 See id.
176 See TEAMLAW, 155 N.J. at 377, 379-80, 715 A.2d at 226,
227 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that discipline should not be imposed
because the attorneys did not have proper notice of the type of conduct that RPC
7.3(b) (1) prohibits).
17 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing
First Amendment
concerns implicated by restricting attorney solicitation of clients).
17 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (discussing how
solicitation is an
effective way to disseminate information about legal services to the general public).
'7 See BLACK'S LAW DICrtoNARY 1574 (6th ed. 1990) ("A law which is so obscure in
its promulgation that a reasonable person could not determine from a reading what
Also, the
the law purports to command ... is void as violative of due process ....
First Amendment requires special clarity so that protected expression will not be...
suppressed."); see also LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsTIrTToNAL LAw §§ 12-31
to 12-32, at 1033-37 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the chilling effect that vague laws have
RABIN, TORTS LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 40-48 (6th ed. 1996).
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rights of lay persons and guards against reputation damage to the
profession caused by overly aggressive solicitation.180
Alternatively, the New Jersey State Legislature is attempting to
balance the competing interests of solicitation by considering a bill
that would make the hiring of a runner, or acting as a runner, a
third-degree crime. 8 ' Interestingly, some states have already made
certain forms of solicitation a felony.' Solicitation in Texas, for example, is punishable by imprisonment of up to ten years and a fine
up to $10,000.3 Perhaps NewJersey is not ready for such a harsh alternative to the RPCs, which do not give rise to civil liability let alone
criminal liability.""
on First Amendment expressive liberties).
ISOSee supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the damage that solicitation has caused to the public's perception of the legal profession); supra notes 7-8
(discussing privacy concerns implicated by permitting attorney solicitation of clients.)
181 See S. 1696, 208th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.J. 1998); A. 2930, 208th Leg.,
2d Sess. (N.J.
1998). As of March 1999, the NewJersey State Legislature was considering a bill that
would make the hiring of a runner, or acting as a runner, a third-degree crime. See
id.
182 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.234 (9) (West 1994). In Florida,
[i]t is unlawful for any attorney to solicit any business relating to the
representation of persons injured in a motor vehicle accident for the
purpose of filing a motor vehicle tort claim or a claim for personal injury protection benefits required by [§] 627.736. The solicitation by
advertising of any business by an attorney relating to the representation of a person injured in a specific motor vehicle accident is prohibited by this section. Any attorney who violates the provisions of this
subsection commits a felony of the third degree ....
Id.
383 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12(a)(1)-(6) (West
1994); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 38.12(0 (West 1994); TEX. PENAL CODEANN. § 12.34 (West 1994). In Texas,
[a] person commits (a third degree felony] if, with the intent to obtain
economic benefit the person:
(1) knowingly institutes a suit or claim that the person has not been
authorized to pursue;
(2) solicits employment, either in person or by telephone, for himself or for another;
(3) pays, gives, or advances or offers to pay, give, or advance to a
prospective client money or anything of value to obtain legal representation from the prospective client;
(4) pays or gives or offers to pay or give a person money or anything of value to solicit employment;
(5) pays or gives or offers to pay or give a family member of a prospective client money or anything of value to solicit employment; or
(6) accepts or agrees to accept money or anything of value to solicit
employment.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12(a)(1)-(6); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.34
(West 1994) (stating the jail time and fines for a third degree felony).
184 See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-7(a) (1998); Baxt v. Liloia, 155 N.J. 190,
197, 714 A.2d 271,
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To their credit, both the New Jersey State Bar Association and
the Red Cross have taken a proactive step in preventing unwanted solicitation while at the same time protecting the rights of accident victims to receive information about legal services and the potential legal remedies available to them.IM These entities have created the
Mass Disaster Response Program, which is the first of its kind in the
nation." * This program provides disaster victims with free informa87
tion concerning their legal rights and remedies at a disaster site.'
Fortunately, the use of this program has not yet been necessary,
but its effectiveness is also unknown.' Ideally, though, this program
may strike a fair balance between the victim's right to privacy and the
legal profession's need to inform the public about the legal services
available.'9 It may assure that victims will not be pressured or misled
into signing away their rights if confronted by insurance agents seeking to settle claims in return for releases from liability.' 9 It also may
protect the emotionally vulnerable victims from the onslaught of eager attorneys seeking to have them sign retainer agreements.' 9 '

274-75 (1998) (stating that a violation of the RPCs does not give rise to a tort claim).
In New Jersey, "[tihe primary purpose of discipline is to protect the public, and not
to punish the attorney." In re Pajerowski, 156 N.J. 509, 521, 721 A.2d 992, 999
(1998) (per curiam) (citing In re Rutledge, 101 N.J. 493, 498, 502 A.2d 569, 572
(1986)).
18
See Sharon A. Balsamo, It's More Than a Paycheck, It's a Profession,N.J. LAw., THE
MAGAzINE,July-Aug. 1997, at 14-16 (discussing the Mass Disaster Response Program);
see also infta notes 186-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Mass Disaster Response Program).
18
See Balsamo, supra note 185, at 15.
187 See id. at 15-16. The Mass Disaster Program was developed in
response to the
conduct of the attorneys after the Durham Woods explosion. See id. at 14-15. The
New Jersey Bar Association maintains a network of volunteer lawyers who have undergone disaster training. See id. These volunteer attorneys sign a pledge not to accept remuneration as a result of any of the disaster-site assistance they may provide.
See id. at 15. The initial training program was lead by the New Jersey State Bar Association, the Red Cross, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. See id.
Volunteer lawyers were trained in federal disaster operations and Red Cross procedures, and participated in role-playing situations. See id.
8
See Telephone interview with Joseph A. Bottitta, President of the New Jersey
State Bar Association, (Apr. 14, 1999).
189 See Balsamo, supra note 185, at 14; see also
supra notes 7-8 and accompanying
text (discussing privacy concerns implicated by permitting attorney solicitation of
clients); supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of disseminating legal information to lay persons).
'9 See Balsamo, supra note 185, at 15; see also supra notes 11-12 and accompanying
text (discussing the importance of disseminating legal information to lay persons).
19
See Balsamo, supra note 185, at 14; see aso supra notes 5-6 and accompanying
text (discussing the harms associated with solicitation).
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Hopefully, this program will help to restore the public's faith in the
integrity and professionalism of the NewJersey bar.'"
CONCLUSION

The New Jersey Supreme Court is not striking an adequate balance of the competing interests raised by attorney solicitation of clients. The court's recent application of RPC 7.3(b) (1) has failed to
provide the legal community with notice as to what types of solicitation are permissible. This lack of guidance, as discussed in Part IV,
could result in preventing lay persons from learning about their legal
rights and remedies at a time when they need to most.
Grace Najarian

19

See Balsamo, supra note 185, at 16.

